




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AFRICA AND THE WORLD TODAY



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CARL G. ROSBERG

ABOUT THE PROJECT

The North Central Colleges and Secondary Schools is an organization devoted to improving education on both the high school and college levels.

The Foreign Relations Project was established by the NCA Committee on Experimental Units through a grant from the Ford Foundation. Since 1955, the Project has developed this series of studies on foreign affairs for high school students, and has offered various services to social studies teachers throughout the nation. Current programs of the Project are supported in part by the Harris Foundation and other grants.

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Africa and the World Today

By: Carl G. Rosberg

Editor: Jo Rosenthal

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Challenges of a Continent

1

In recent years Africa has leapt into prominence on the stage of world affairs. Its dramatic—and frequently violent—struggles for independence have captured the attention of Americans, impelling us to learn more about a continent we have too long ignored. For Africa, to most Americans, has been little more than a vast stereotype: a “Dark Continent,” a land of jungles and witch doctors, wild animals and exotic peoples.

Some Americans might have pointed out special interests which the United States had in Africa. Over 100 years ago we helped establish the state of Liberia as a home for freed slaves. Its very name means free, and its capital is named after an American president, James Monroe. During the nineteenth century American missionaries went to Africa as preachers of the gospel and as educators. Throughout the years American churches have continued to support Christian missions in Africa. Some of Africa’s young leaders have been educated at schools still supported by American church missions, and an increasing number of Africans now continue their studies in American universities. In addition many private businessmen from the United States have made considerable investments in African mines and other enterprises.

Except for these special interests, however, Africa was largely ignored by American policy before World War II. Consequently when African problems did arise, they were treated by us as another aspect of our relations with European powers. For all practical purposes Africa was considered an extension of Europe.

World War II heightened American awareness of Africa’s growing importance in world affairs. We had always advocated the just and humane administration of colonial peoples, and after the War we supported policies of self-government. But we stressed “orderly revolution,” and talked about the need for gradualism in political develop-

ment and the dangers which lay in "premature independence." Few Americans had any real sense of the incredibly swift force of nationalism and independence which was to sweep all Africa.

Today, the question of whether African states are actually ready to govern themselves is no longer appropriate. Most of Africa is free and its leaders are actively concerned with problems of social betterment. By the end of 1964, 36 independent states had emerged from this vast continent, and by 1970, the number of new nations will perhaps be more than forty.

Awakened to new hopes, Africa's leadership seeks dignity and self-rule, a decent standard of living, control of political machinery, and a responsible role in world affairs for its people. The new prime ministers and presidents are determined that Africa shape its own future, choose its own friends, and develop its own personality.

It has become clear to the United States government, and private agencies as well, that imaginative and far-reaching African programs are needed. For the first time in our history, a Bureau for African Affairs has been established in the State Department. The countries of Africa today are no longer treated as European possessions, but as important in their own right.

AMERICAN-AFRICAN TIES. Because of our faith in democracy, we take a genuine interest in the African's struggle for freedom and self-government. In turn, many Africans look upon the American War of Independence as an anticolonial struggle and feel that the United States and Africa thus share a common historical heritage. Having derived many of the values of liberty, equality, and progress from the West,

as well as from their own societies, Africans expect that the United States will continue to offer to support these values. Common ideals and hopes have done much to foster friendship between Americans and Africans.

From a military standpoint, Africa's strategic location is vital to our national security. In North Africa, the Suez Canal serves as the doorway to the East. South Africa guards the around-the-cape route, the only other sea link between Western Europe and Asia. To protect its interest in the Mediterranean, the United States maintains an air base in Libya and communications in Eritrea.

In addition to these ideological, political, and military factors, economic considerations are growing in significance. At present we do about one billion dollars' worth of trade a year with Africa. Moreover, United States dependence on raw materials from other lands is rapidly increasing. If we continue to use our own resources at the present rate, in the next few years we shall have to import one fifth of all raw materials. This means that Africa is of great potential importance as a source of iron ore, aluminum, uranium, bauxite, oil, and other materials vital to our industries.

Clearly the effect which Africa will have upon our own future means that we can no longer afford to be indifferent. Even if the Cold War did not exist, even if Africa's resources did not command our attention, or even if we were not morally and spiritually committed to Africa's betterment, the story of Africa would be well worth the study. Africa is the world's last frontier, and in an age which looks to outer space we are reminded that, for some peoples, the conquest of earth remains.

THE NATIONS OF AFRICA



"KEY: At the beginning of this century Liberia and Ethiopia were the only independent countries in Africa. In 1965, only the areas in black are not independent."

Russel Lenz in *The Christian Science Monitor*.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

What is a stereotype? What are some of the common misconceptions which Ameri-

cans have about Africa? How do you think such misconceptions originated? What can we do to get rid of them?



The Geographical Setting

2

African geography has molded and conditioned human existence to a greater degree than has any other major continent. The Sahara Desert, a tropical environment, and unfavorable coastal conditions cut much of Africa off from the outside world. In addition to being isolated from European and Asian cultures, Africans are separated from one another by the mountains, dense rainforest areas, and dangerous rivers of this continent's interior. The contrasting regions of the plateau and the rainforests influenced the distribution of Africa's population and development, and a combination of geographical features largely determined European exploration and settlement. Indeed geography played a major role in shaping Africa's past. Although modern technology has overcome many of the handicaps once posed by Africa's geography, topography and climate continue to define many of Africa's problems of economic and social development today.

A huge continent, Africa is second only to Asia in size. It covers an area of approximately $11\frac{3}{4}$ million square miles—more than three and a half times the size of the United States, including Hawaii and Alaska. Africa sits squarely on the equator and extends almost equally into both the northern and southern hemispheres. It is about 2500 miles from the equator to Africa's northernmost point and about 2400 miles from the equator to its southernmost tip. (By comparison New York is 2580 miles from San Francisco.) Size is generally considered an asset, because large land areas can provide opportunities for the exploration and development of new regions. However, as we shall see, many of the advantages which might have come from Africa's size have been offset by its equatorial position.

The most outstanding feature of Africa's geography is the Sahara Desert, a vast area of sand and intense heat, which stretches across Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. When we compare

again distances in Africa with those in the United States, we see that the Sahara is so large (3,000,000 square miles) that this desert could almost encompass the continental United States. The presence of a wasteland of this magnitude running the entire width of Africa has greatly influenced Africa's development. It has, in fact, created *two* Africas—a North Africa and an Africa south of the Sahara.

TWO AFRICAS. North Africa consists of a relatively narrow strip of land which runs between the northern rim of the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea. For thousands of years various civilizations have flourished along this coastal region. As early as 1000 B.C., the Phoenicians had founded the colonies of Utica and Carthage. Later, Greeks and Romans explored North Africa, establishing colonies and trading centers throughout the Mediterranean coast. The Arabs also had traded for centuries with North Africa as well as East African coastal towns, and until the seventh century A.D., Arab influence in North Africa was limited to these commercial enterprises.

At the turn of the sixth century, however, the rise of Islam gave new impetus to the growth of Arab influence throughout the Near East and North Africa. The genuine appeal of Islam, the results of religious wars, plus the commercial and social advantages which many traders found by becoming Muslims brought about the firm entrenchment of Islam in North Africa.

The Arabs brought with them not only their religions, but also their language, customs, and entire way of life. Today North Africans closely resemble Arab peoples in physical appearance, and they are tied closely to the Arab world by cultural and

emotional likenesses and by historical tradition. Because of the strong likenesses between North Africans and Arabic peoples, the countries of North Africa are usually associated with those of the Middle East. Thus, even though Mediterranean Africa is an integral part of the continent, we shall not discuss it in this study. Instead, we shall use the term *Africa* to mean not the entire continent, but only that part of Africa south of the Sahara.

SUBSAHARAN AFRICA. Subsaharan Africa consists mainly of a vast and rather even plateau, bordered by a narrow coastal belt from which this plateau rises. A very rough idea of the plateau can be grasped if we imagine an inverted saucer. The altitude ranges from 1000 feet in West Central Africa to slightly over 3000 feet in Southern Africa to an average of 6000 feet in Eastern Africa. But in parts of East Africa this plateau reach altitudes of 10,000 feet or more. The descent from this relatively level plateau to the coastal belt is steep, and has created tremendous problems in transportation and communication between the interior and the coast.

In many areas the coastline is almost totally lacking in natural harbors, bays, or inlets. And for many years little shelter was available to sailing vessels which tried to reach the interior. On the west coast, the prevailing winds blow out towards the ocean. Moreover, many river mouths are often clogged by sandbars. A short distance inland, African rivers are frequently blocked by waterfalls and shoals, although upper parts of these rivers may be navigable. The Congo and the Nile rivers, for example, provide thousands of miles of navigable waterways. During the nineteenth


century the rapids and waterfalls which block Africa's rivers represented major deterrents to explorers or traders who wished to reach the interior. Cataracts still create serious problems in transportation, but they are gradually being turned into valuable assets. Water power has become a vital source of energy for Africa's growing industries.

THE CLIMATE OF AFRICA. As the map on this page indicates, much of Africa lies within tropical latitudes. The heat and humidity of these West Central regions of Africa together with tropical diseases which flourish in rainforest atmospheres make intensive physical work of any duration exhausting. Fatal or crippling diseases abound in large areas. And the tsetse fly (which carries sleeping sickness) and the malaria mosquito have prevented the use of land and animals. Modern medicine has done much to eliminate tropical diseases. But sleeping sickness and malaria as well as other diseases such as pneumonia, blackwater fever, and tuberculosis continue to take a heavy toll of lives.

However we must not assume that all Africa consists of rainforests. As one moves either north or south of the wet center in West Central Africa, the amount of rainfall diminishes. Of course many parts of the Sahara never get any rain at all, and large areas of south of the Sahara suffer from inadequate rainfall.

RESOURCES. Although Africa is basically an agricultural continent, soil and rainfall inadequacies pose major obstacles to agricultural productivity. With a few important exceptions, African soils are poor in quality and are constantly endangered by erosion and outdated methods of farming. Indeed,

REGIONS AND BARRIERS




By permission: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher.

it has been estimated that only fifteen per cent of the continent has conditions favorable for agriculture—climate, soil, rainfall, absence of tsetse fly, etc.

Although Africa is presently poor in agricultural resources, its mineral resources are believed to be enormous. Long known as a major supplier of the world's diamonds and gold, Africa is of vital importance as a source of other strategic materials. Copper, asbestos, lead, and manganese come from southern Africa; cobalt and ferro-alloys from the Congo; and manganese, hardwood logs, and iron ore from West Africa. Aluminum, uranium, and bauxite are also found in abundant quantities.

DIVERSE POPULATION. Population estimates vary, but experts generally agree that the population of Subsaharan Africa is around 200,000,000. About five million of

MINERAL RESOURCES



By permission: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher.

these are non-Africans. Most of the non-Africans are Europeans or of European descent (three and a half million). The Asians constitute the next largest group of non-Africans and number approximately 750,000. The Coloureds, a large non-African group of about one million, are mainly found in South Africa and to some extent in the Rhodesias. These people are a result of racial mixture and do not form a part of any indigenous culture. Arabs are found along the Kenya coast and in Zanzibar.

EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT. When we speak of Europeans in Africa we should not lose sight of an important fact: namely, that many of the "European" residents of Africa feel few ties or loyalties to Europe. European settlement in Africa often goes back one, two, or even three centuries—the Dutch, for instance, began to settle in South

Africa in the middle of the 1600's. Thus while it is convenient to refer to the white residents of Africa as "Europeans," it should be remembered that, for many of them, Europe is hardly more a homeland than is Britain to residents of the United States.

The distribution of Africa's European population was largely determined by two important geographical features, the plateau of Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa and the forest and savannah region of West and Central Africa. The temperate climate and relative lack of tropical diseases in the high plateau areas made Eastern, Southern, and Central Africa suitable for European and other non-African settlement. Since the plateau regions could easily accommodate Europeans, many came to make their living by farming or mining.

The overwhelming majority of Europeans live in South Africa and Rhodesia where they continue to command political and social power. Within Kenya, in East Africa, Europeans were until 1960 the politically dominant community. A large Asian population is to be found in South Africa as well as throughout East Africa. Extensive European settlement is still being encouraged in Angola and to some extent in Mozambique.

On the other hand, the disease-infested tropical areas of the lower Congo and West Africa discouraged European settlement. Although traders and entrepreneurs established many contacts in these regions, very few Europeans became residents.

CONCLUSION. Looking at Africa's geography from the perspectives of the past, we see that in comparison with the geographies of Europe, North America, or even Asia, this continent was singularly unfavored.

Much of African society remained small in scale and poverty-stricken. Africa's people were, until relatively recently, virtually isolated from the outside world and from one another. Since small indigenous groups were not powerful enough to ward off alien intrusion, many were vulnerable to domination and exploitation. Moreover, geographical factors have meant low productivity, low density of population, and widespread poverty.

Nevertheless we should not make the mistake of assuming that Africa nurtured no civilization of its own. Despite the handicaps posed by Africa's geography, extensive

and highly-developed cultures flourished in parts of Africa. And we shall now take a brief look at some early African kingdoms.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. How would you explain the fact that hundreds of languages are spoken in Africa? What problems does a lack of common language create in nation-building? In establishing interstate relations?
2. Even though the countries of Mediterranean Africa are more closely identified with the Middle East, what are some of the common denominators between these nations and those south of the Sahara?



The Historical Setting


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Although we still know little about Africa's past, archaeologists and historians have uncovered some of Africa's heritage, and the stories of conquest and empire building are becoming known. Cultures of Ethiopia, the Western Sudan, and the East Coast of Africa reached a remarkable level of development. Archaeological excavations at the famous ruins of Zimbabwe in Southern Africa have revealed the existence of ancient temples, palaces, and buildings. As early as the eighth century, the Zimbabwe empire had a highly complex social and political organization, a well-developed knowledge of stone construction, and great architectural craftsmanship.

In the horn of Africa, Ethiopia has existed as an independent Christian empire since the fourth century A.D. Art, irrigation-terraced cultivation, and stone construction were all known to the Abyssinian people. (Abyssinia is another name for Ethiopia.) Also Ethiopia developed cultural skills which seem to have contributed much to other parts of the continent.

For centuries there was constant movement, migration, and historical change in Africa. Egyptian influences spread westward across the continent. And after the camel was introduced into North Africa, the Arabs and Berbers found ways to penetrate into an area known as the Western Sudan. The Western Sudan or savannah belt region is an area of low brush, scrub, and bush, several hundred miles wide, which stretches across the southern edge of the Sahara. Since the savannah belt cuts into the Sahara, the North Africans managed to establish trade routes across the narrowest sections of the Desert. In return for the figs, dates, and salt which the trade caravans brought south, the Negro peoples bartered ivory, kola nuts, gold, and slaves.

Not all exchanges, however, were those of peaceful trade. In sharp contrast to the farmers who lived in the Sudan, the Arab and Berber



tribesmen were fierce warriors. Moreover the tribes from North Africa were well-organized and consequently were able to conquer the scattered Negro tribes they encountered.

Often a conquering group would establish its authority over a vast area and over a population many times larger than itself. But even though they conquered local chiefs and established their own political controls, the North Africans never attempted to unify the different peoples within their territories. Usually the only thing which the conquered peoples shared in common was the fact of subjugation. As a consequence the foundations of these empires consisted of little more than the tight social and military organization of the invading forces. The failure to create political unity was a cause for the decline of the early Arab-Berber empires.

THE ARAB IMPACT. The pattern of decline varied considerably. Sometimes a Negro people who had learned methods of warfare and organization either from direct experience or from trading caravans would set out on conquests of their own. Sometimes the traders themselves founded empires.

Many Arabs and Berbers settled among local tribes in the Western Sudan. And as they were assimilated by the Negro communities, the North Africans tended to lose their warlike characteristics.

* The conquered Negro communities took on Arab traits and ways—the religion of Islam, in some instances the Arabic languages, and many of the physiological features of Arabs. Thus the long period of contact and the large numbers of North Africans who settled in the savannah belt

have given the Sudan a historically unique character. Many specialists distinguish between Western Sudan and Africa south of the Sudan.

HISTORIC EMPIRES. Long before the rise of Islam, the peoples of this northern part of West Africa had developed well-organized states. Two modern countries have taken their names from empires which developed in Western Sudan: Ghana and Mali. In our day, the very selection of the name Ghana for the West African area known as the Gold Coast indicates the pride which Africans take in their historical culture. The empire of ancient Ghana was one of the earliest states of the savannah belt region, and dates from about the second century A.D.

According to local tradition, lighter-skinned peoples—perhaps Berbers from North Africa—settled among a Negro people, the Soninke, who lived in the extreme north of the Western Sudan. The lighter-skinned settlers became politically dominant during the fourth century and ruled until late in the eighth century when they were overthrown by Negro conquerors.

The greatness of Ghana stemmed from its commercially strategic location. For, as the map on page 12 shows, Ghana could control much of the trade across the Sahara Desert. Despite severe military defeats in the eleventh century, Ghana lasted until 1240 when it was overthrown by the rising power of Mali.

Mali was probably the richest and most powerful empire of Western Sudan. Although Mali defeated Ghana in 1240, it did not reach the height of its greatness until the reign of Mansa Masa from 1307-1332. Under his rule Mali became renowned

HISTORICAL KINGDOMS



throughout Europe and Africa, and the empire continued to flourish until the seventeenth century. Today the name Mali continues in the Republic of Mali, the former French Sudan.

KINGDOMS OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

The Arabs and Berbers never extended their warring operations south of Western Sudan. They may have been discouraged by the rainforests which lay below the savannah region, or they may have been unable to defeat the powerful Negro tribes in the rainforests.

Although a great deal of evidence is not available, there is considerable information about four large states that developed in West Africa and in the regions of the Guinea rainforest—Oyo, Benin, Dahomey, and Ashanti. Both Oyo and Benin produced remarkable bronze and stone statuary. Oyo, the earliest of the rainforest states, was also the largest and the most powerful. Oyo flourished throughout the Middle Ages

and reached its height in the middle of the eighteenth century.

At its peak, Oyo comprised most of what is now the western region of Nigeria and eastern Dahomey. Oyo itself did not extend to the sea. But it carried on trade through coastal towns which it influenced and where there were colonies of Yoruba, people loyal to Oyo. During the eighteenth century Oyo became actively involved in the European slave trade, an enterprise which eventually led to its downfall. For while Oyo princes squabbled over the division of profits from the slave trade, the empire gradually disintegrated.

THE ASHANTI. Another rainforest state, the Ashanti confederacy, is famous for its wars against the British. Ashanti originated in the seventeenth century when a number of small tribes banded together to defeat the larger, powerful Denkera tribe. Using the symbol of a Golden Stool (a golden throne), Ashanti achieved tremendous allegiance and unity from the various tribes within the federation.

Ashanti religion was also an important source of loyalty and strength in the Ashanti nation. The Ashanti believed that a community existed between the world of the dead and that of the living. When a member of the Ashanti died, he joined his relatives who had gone before to live in a spirit world which closely resembled life on earth.

Indeed, the Ashanti maintained that their land really belonged to the ancestral spirits and that they only had a right to use it temporarily. The spirits of the ancestors kept close watch over their relatives who were still living, punishing those who behaved badly and rewarding those Ashanti who did well. Thus disloyal or other un-

orthodox behavior was not only a political offense but a religious sin as well.

The Ashanti chief combined religious and political roles in himself. He was regarded as endowed with sacred qualities that enabled him to communicate with ancestral deities and to intercede with them. The whole social and political pattern of kinship and chieftaincy became so closely intertwined with spiritual beliefs that tribal law and religious law were one and the same for the Ashanti.

These beliefs continue as a force among the Ashanti peoples. But they are rapidly being replaced by new concepts of national politics and loyalties.

Ashanti was located roughly in the center of contemporary Ghana. Eventually the Ashanti tried to gain control of all the territory as far south as the coast. In the process of expansion, however, the Ashanti confederacy absorbed a number of tribes which were not as loyal to the Golden Stool as the original group had been. Consequently disunity seriously weakened the confederacy which was ultimately defeated in the nineteenth century by the superior military strength of the British forces.

ARAB INFLUENCE IN EAST AFRICA. Eastern Africa, like the Western Sudan, came under the influence of Arab traders very early in recorded history. In general, however, Arab influence was confined to coastal towns and a few scattered outposts in the interior. The interior remained under the control of African tribes.

Indian traders also came to the East Coast of Africa, probably as early as the sixth century B.C. Intense rivalry for African trade soon developed between the Arabs and the Indians. The Arabs emerged vic-

torious and by the sixth century A.D. were in control of the East African coast. The Arabs maintained their monopoly until the Portuguese came.

THE COMING OF THE EUROPEANS. The arrival of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century marked the beginning of modern African exploration. In spite of the legend that the seas around Africa were full of terror, Portuguese ships crossed the equator in 1471 and reached the mouth of the Congo in 1482. In 1487, Vasco da Gama made his famous voyage when he rounded the Cape and sailed to India.

Portugal managed to keep the monopoly of shipping and contact with the African continent for approximately 75 years. But in the middle of the sixteenth century other European countries began to challenge Portuguese domination. After more than a century (1640-1750) of sharp competition among the English, French, and Dutch to set up forts and trading stations along the West African coast, the English and French gained control of that coast.

Meanwhile the Dutch had begun their settlement of South Africa with the landing of Jan van Riebeeck at Table Bay in 1652. At first Dutch settlement in southern Africa grew slowly. When the British permanently occupied South Africa during the Napoleonic wars (1806), European settlement on the Cape numbered scarcely more than 30,000 people.

During the late 1800's, however, settlement grew rapidly. Large numbers of British settlers migrated, and the discovery of gold and diamonds acted as a magnet for both the Dutch and English people. More than 3,000,000 people of European descent now live in South Africa.

The expansion of European settlement is of great importance in the later history of South Africa. Indeed the pattern of European settlement throughout the continent has had enormous implications for Africa's development. Nevertheless it was the slave trade which set the major theme of early European contact with Africa, and colored subsequent Afro-European relations.

SLAVERY. Many centuries before the Europeans came, the Arabs had engaged in slaving operations in the Western Sudan, Southern Sudan, Eastern Africa, and elsewhere. An Arab slave trade had also existed in the Western Sudan since the first caravans crossed the Sahara, but it never attained the proportions of the European trade.

The arrival of Portuguese on the East African coast did not interfere with the Arab slave trade; if anything it intensified the process. In fact the Portuguese slave trade can be considered an offshoot of the Arab slave trade since the Portuguese bought their slaves from Arab merchants.

Although Portugal started the European slave trade in the middle of the fifteenth century, activity did not really begin in earnest until a century later. Around 1530, Spain, in search of slaves to work the gold and silver mines in Mexico and Peru, began the transatlantic shipment of slaves. In 1620, English ships landed the first slaves in the American colonies in Virginia. By the middle of the seventeenth century, slave traders from England, Portugal, France, Holland, and Sweden were heavily competing to supply slaves to planters in the West Indies and in the Americas. England gradually gained control and by 1785 dominated the slave trade.

SLAVERY'S AFTERMATH. It has been estimated that between fifteen and twenty million slaves were landed on the American continent from the beginning of the slave trade in the sixteenth century. For every slave landed on the American continent, at least one other African lost his life somewhere in the course of the slaving process. Thus during the three centuries of the West African slave trade, Africa lost approximately 30 to 40 million young men and women.

We can only speculate about the damage that this loss of life caused to Africa. What might Africa have been had these people remained to contribute to its cultural, economic, and political development?

The slave trade created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among the inland tribes. A majority of the slaves transported across the Atlantic Ocean were rarely captured by Europeans themselves. Instead the Europeans bought slaves from African coastal chiefs, who organized slaving raids deep into the interior. The enormous profits which they received from the trade spurred many groups such as the Oyo to attack other tribes in order to capture and sell slaves.

In addition to creating an incentive for tribal warfare, the slave trade promoted false prosperity among certain tribes. It was easier for a tribe to use slaving income to buy European goods than to build up its own industry.

Thus the slave trade not only robbed Africa of countless numbers of young people who might have taken an important role in developing industry and crafts, but it also served to discourage Africans from wanting to develop a vital society.

Moreover the slave trade was a major factor keeping Europeans out of Africa's interior. The brutality of the slave trade, and the suffering and misery which it created, aroused tremendous hatred and fear of Europeans among inland tribes. As long as the Africans supplied slaves there was no need to go further inland. The coastal tribes also tried to prevent European movement into the continent, for they feared that their privileged positions would be threatened if the Europeans ever made sufficient inroads to carry on the slave trade themselves.

AGE OF ADVENTURE. Apart from the Dutch-English settlement in South Africa, Europeans confined their activities to struggles over forts and trading posts on the coast. During the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, individual explorers penetrated the interior.

The period 1769-1873 is known as the "classical age" of African exploration. It begins with James Bruce's attempts to discover the source of the Nile River and ends with the death of David Livingstone. We can only mention a few of the most famous explorers of this era, but behind each name lies an extraordinary tale of adventure and hardship. Just after the turn of the nineteenth century, Mungo Park explored vast areas of West Africa in an effort to trace the course of the Niger River. This task was completed by the Langer brothers, who discovered the mouth of the Niger in 1830.

John Speke and Samuel Baker carried out important explorations in East Africa. Dr. Livingstone himself spent 20 years in exploration before he died in Northern Rhodesia. His work was then carried on by Henry Stanley, who, in an epochal explora-

"Modern Times"



Behrendt in *Algemeen Handelsblad*, Amsterdam.

tion, circled Lake Victoria and traced the Congo River to the Atlantic.

Today, unknown regions are surveyed by plane and the latest photographic equipment, but nineteenth century explorers relied on little more than their own equipment and ingenuity. Yet the maps, articles, and books which these men wrote are largely responsible for early European knowledge of Africa's interior. Indeed the explorations of these men and others paved the way for Africa's partitioning at the end of the nineteenth century.

BEGINNINGS OF COLONIALISM. Once the Europeans gained access to Africa's interior, the continent was parceled out to various powers in a very short time. In 1875, less than one tenth of Africa was under foreign rule; twenty years later, less than one tenth remained free.

One might well ask why Europeans suddenly developed a bursting interest in African territories. Earlier in the nineteenth century, economists had considered

colonies a useless and wasteful burden on the mother country. But as the industrial revolution grew in Europe, colonies were viewed as sources of raw materials for rapidly expanding industries and as markets for goods. Colonies were also considered a source of national prestige. Moreover it became easier to exploit Africa's resources as advances in communications, transportation, and methods of treating tropical diseases broke down the barriers of African geography. Some Europeans were motivated by purely humanitarian impulses to correct the wrong that had been done to Africa by the slave trade.

Thus far we have been looking at the geographical and historical setting of Africa. Let us now turn to a study of African cultures.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. What similarities do you see in European and Arab patterns of conquest? What are some of the differences in the way Europeans and Arabs established controls over large areas?
2. How do you account for the fact that Portugal and Belgium, two of Europe's smallest countries, were able to acquire large colonial holdings in Africa?



Traditional Africa

4

Today the traditional world often exists side by side with the new technological society. Western and Asian influences have penetrated and modified traditional African societies in almost every part of the continent. Yet despite nearly 100 years of European control, the fundamental patterns of African society—communal ties of kinship and tribe, the role of chieftaincy, communal land holdings, and farming—continue to be essential forces in presentday life.

Many of the new social and political institutions in Africa seem to be combinations of native African cultural patterns and institutions introduced by Europeans or Asians.

In American society, we usually think of the family as a man, his wife, and their children. Although other relatives—grandparents, for instance—may be part of an American household, family loyalties and responsibilities are frequently limited in scope to parents and their children. Anthropologists often refer to this as the biological or nuclear family because it is the smallest and most basic kind of family unit.

Traditional African societies, however, are generally based on a system of “extended families,” where patterns of responsibility and obligation based on blood ties or marriage extend far beyond the bounds of an average western family. Indeed kinship ties provide the basic social and political organization of most traditional African societies. The kin group varies considerably from tribe to tribe, but essentially it consists of a number of families whose male members trace their descent from a common ancestry. In some tribes descent may be traced in the female (matrilineal) line.

In some societies the kin group shares rights to land and valuable property such as cattle. In tribes where there is little development of specialized political authority, the kinship group is the basic instrument for the protection of the rights and privileges of its members.

Here the only allegiance of an individual is to his kinship group. Even in relatively complex tribes—that is, tribes with centralized authority, explicit administrative machinery, and judicial institutions—the basic components of the political system are usually kin groups.

Chieftaincy is another important institution in Subsaharan Africa. Although the power and influence exerted by chiefs has been undermined in much of Africa and challenged by the rise of young, modern leadership, chieftaincy continues to be vital in the life of the tribe.

Despite wide variation in power and authority, African chiefs have rarely been absolute or despotic. Disputes have often been—and continue to be—settled between kinship groups before they reach the chief, in somewhat the same way that domestic or minor civil issues are settled out of court in the United States. When the chief does make decisions, he often consults the leading men of the tribe before he gives his verdict. Religious concepts of the role of chieftaincy further limit the power a chief can wield in the day to day life of the tribe. Moreover, since the chief's primary function is to preserve tradition and symbolize the tribe's unity and historical continuity, he seeks to stand aloof from politics.

That is not to say, of course, that there have never been any absolute or despotic chiefs. Among the Bantu of Southern Africa, the chief exerted considerable control. As legislator and judge he could inflict capital punishment, control the distribution and use of land, provide for the poor and needy, and reward those who served him. In general, however, chieftaincy has been and is today a benevolent institution with the

powers of the chief determined by public sentiment.

TRIBES AND DIVERSITY. Tribes vary in size and each one has its particular system of political organization by which it governs its members. Some tribes are large, highly organized, and well integrated. Others, equally large, have no centralized leadership, but are linked together by kinship and common religious beliefs. It is important to distinguish four types of traditional African political organizations:

1. *Administrative territorial states.* These usually came into being when an outside group conquered and established political domination over an area. As we have seen, the historic states of the Western Sudan—Ghana and Mali—were set up in this way by alien invaders, and many were later strengthened by Islam. Administrative and judicial functions are exercised on a territorial basis through recognized governmental institutions. An aristocracy, supported by military force, rules. Class structure is present, with kinship playing a minor political role in local governments throughout the territory. The Fulani-Hausa states of northern Nigeria provide an example of administrative territorial states.

2. *Centralized chiefdoms.* Chiefdoms which originated either through conquest or federation have been common throughout Subsaharan Africa. While chiefdoms have varied enormously in both size and power, they are alike in that political authority rests in the hands of the royal hereditary kin group or clan. As we have seen, a variety of checks and balances is placed on the powers of chieftaincy.

3. *Dispersed tribal societies.* No common central organs of government exist.

Instead a network of kinship groups, common religious beliefs, and a common ancestry producing a sense of tribal relationship serve to unite this type of society. The politically important Kikuyu and Luo of Kenya are examples of dispersed tribal societies.

4. *Local autonomous communities.* These communities usually numbered only a few hundred people, who existed in the more remote forests, swamps, and grasslands. All members of the community were usually related through kinship ties.


The different attitudes fostered by these patterns of traditional government have carried over into modern political life for those Africans who still adhere to older customs. Moreover the location, distribution, and interaction of these systems within the new territorial states lead to a variety of problems in nation-building.

CUSTOM AND LAW. Traditional African culture did not have a written body of rules and regulations. There were prescribed unwritten methods, however, and established procedures for settlement of disputes within tribes and conflicts with tribal leadership. The codes of behavior established by custom were followed scrupulously.

Insurrections in traditional Africa were rarely revolutions which challenged the institutions of leadership. Rather they were rebellions, questioning the ability of individual leaders to maintain and preserve these institutions. And usually these rebellions reaffirmed the dignity and acceptance of tribal political institutions.

RELIGION. Religion plays an important part in cultural divisions within Sub-Saharan Africa. Major distinctions may be

AFRICA'S RELIGIONS



Veit, Martin, & Podorson—Foreign Policy Association.

made between Islam, Christianity, and the various tribal religions, each of which influences about one third of the total population of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Many Africans follow their indigenous or tribal religions. Some believe that every object in the world has a spirit. Others believe that many objects have magic powers to do good or evil. Through various rituals, charms, and customs, the Africans seek to appease the spirits of the earth, to bring about justice within their clans, or to insure the arrival of abundant crops and good fortune.

Often belief in magic and witchcraft provided ways to strengthen tribal and clan solidarity. In the face of catastrophes, which might have otherwise split the tribe, blame could be placed outside the group on some hidden or unknown enemy. Today belief in magic and witchcraft has undergone profound changes with modern forms of social and economic organization.

TRADITIONAL ECONOMY. In the main, African peoples have been herdsmen or subsistence farmers producing only what they needed, or just enough to exchange for what they needed. Consequently differences in individual wealth were not generally large, and social status did not depend on ownership of goods or property. Land was generally held in common by the tribe or kin group. The individual could use it, but he did not assume personal ownership.

The African in the past viewed his security not by the amount of property he held but by the number of persons who were obligated to him. If a large number of persons owed him assistance, he felt he could call on them if the need arose. The concept of security as a claim to the services of others was manifested, for example, in the attitude of the African towards cattle. The tribal African considered the borrowing and lending of cattle as a way of building up reciprocal obligations and interpersonal allegiances.


Viewed through the glasses of contemporary America, many traditional African customs and social patterns seem strange. The absence of individualism, a belief in

wizards and superstitions, keeping more than one wife, or dealing in cattle instead of cash—all are alien to western ways.

Yet, through established rituals, long standing customs, and an intimate network of personal relationships, Africans derived an immense feeling of security. Tribes and kin groups commanded extraordinary loyalty and allegiance from their members, while spiritual and social values bound people very closely together. Tribal unity has represented a vital source of African strength.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. Why was the large kinship group well adapted for the conditions of life in traditional Africa? What advantages did the individual derive from membership in such a group? What were his obligations to other members of the group?
2. How did the traditional African society manage to function without a body of written laws? What were the roles of custom and group pressure in regulating behavior? Can you think of instances where custom or group pressure serve as "laws" in the United States?



The Colonial Impact

5

In Subsaharan Africa today there are 31 independent African states. Not only the boundaries of these states, but also their most important characteristics—the patterns of society, commerce, and politics—have been profoundly shaped by the impact of the western colonial powers. For the impact of the West on Africa does not merely take the form of the trappings of western governments, such as parliaments, congresses, or political parties; it permeates all aspects of African life. Providing for their children's school and college education, saving for a small car, or trying to amass capital for opening a business are, particularly in urban areas, becoming increasingly familiar problems to the African husband and father. When we speak of colonialism, we should thus try to separate in our minds the cultural impact of the West from the impact of foreign rule. The new states of Africa reject foreign rule but they cannot reject the impact of the West on their own societies. Even when foreign rule ends, the impact of the West continues. Indeed the most important heritage left by western culture is that very idea which led the African people to challenge colonial rule—the idea of the nation-state.

What do we mean by the impact of western culture? This expression covers a very broad area, since it connotes the whole process of interaction between western and African civilizations. The word "western" alone brings to mind a wealth of institutions, ideas, and values which characterize our culture. For example, a Judaeo-Christian tradition, a democratic government, the idea of progress through science, the importance of the individual, the secularization of human affairs, and industrialization are outstanding features of our western heritage.

The impact of western culture extends far beyond casual encounters between a few Europeans and Africans. It embodies entire social, ideological, political, and economic patterns of behavior implanted by

Europeans throughout the continent of Africa. Also implicit in the expression "western impact" is the manner in which western culture was transplanted. Private businesses, governments, missionaries, and soldiers of fortune have all, in varying degrees, penetrated and modified traditional African society.

The changes wrought by the western impact on traditional African culture are extremely complex. Social, political, and economic development differs from one African state to another, and wide disparities exist within individual states. Nevertheless almost every part of Africa is undergoing some transformation. In this chapter we shall focus our attention on the major aspects of political, social, and economic evolution.

One of the most important changes occurring in Africa is the progressive shift from a subsistence to a market economy. As we have seen, a subsistence economy is on a small scale since farmers and herdsmen produce only for their own use or for barter. In contrast, a market economy is a fairly complex system involving resources (which means all natural resources), the buying and selling of goods, labor, capital, land, and management. As these resources are developed, used, or loaned, their owners receive income in the form of rent, wages, interest, and profit. A market economy is thus based upon money, wage labor, and income.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES. When the Europeans came, they saw that great profit could be made from Africa's farmlands and mines. Private corporations opened up large-scale development of Africa's mineral resources, establishing copper, gold, diamond, and other mining in-

dustries. They also encouraged the growing of cash crops for export—cocoa, coffee, bananas, cotton, peanuts, and many other products.

As the economic and strategic value of the colonies increased, the governments of France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Portugal stepped in to assume tighter controls. They established various political and administrative systems in their territories. As we shall see, the way in which the European powers administered and utilized the resources of its colonies greatly affected development within the African territories.

Needing revenue to support the machinery and services of colonial rule and wishing to ensure the greatest possible benefit to the mother country, the European powers fostered development of Africa's resources either through their own initiative or by encouraging private enterprise.

Americans take a market economy for granted and assume that everybody earns money in some form or other. However the shift from an economy in which goods are produced on a small scale for limited consumption to an economy in which goods are produced for the domestic market or for export, has seriously disrupted traditional African social organization.

Large numbers of Africans have become workers in the industries, businesses, and government offices of the new towns and cities, in the mines, and on European and—to a limited extent—African-owned farms.

New social groups have emerged with opportunities to acquire status or wealth. Prestige no longer necessarily depends on the number of cattle a man owns or the people who are obligated to him. Instead social standing might come through own-

ing a bicycle or a car, by getting a western education, or by holding a responsible position in a political association or government office. Moreover the chance to make money in Africa's industries has tempted many young people to break away from various tribal and kinship constraints.

Rapid change often brings instability as well as economic insecurity to those Africans whose emotional ties to traditional values have been weakened. Economic insecurity accompanied by other grievances and frustrations has provided many issues for political movements and other protest or reform groups.

NEW LIFE IN CITIES. Like all rural peoples who have moved to big cities and towns, Africans find urban living very different from life in their country towns. Not only must Africans adjust to the quickened pace of a technological environment; often they are confronted with crowded housing conditions and adverse work situations which create unprecedented problems.

The cities, however, do not consist only of so-called "detribalized" Africans. Many social institutions of the village carry over into the urban centers. When an African moves to a city, he usually seeks out members of his kin or tribe who help him adjust to the new way of life. Many welfare and recreation agencies have grown from kinship groups which come together in the cities and towns.

It should also be noted that African leaders often use kinship and tribal associations as ready-made organizations in the building of modern political movements and parties.

NERVE CENTERS OF NATIONALISM. Since many African cities are multitribal

and multiracial, urban living provides a strong force in the building of new territorial societies and national unity. Trade unions, cultural associations, improvement societies, political parties, and other institutions cut across tribal ties and foster values of African unity. For many Africans the unique experience of urban life is not contact with the Europeans; he has met the Belgians, English, or French in his rural area. Rather, the significant exchanges occur when Africans of different languages, tribes, customs, and heritage meet one another. Many individuals and their associations maintain close contact with the rural areas and thereby carry values of African nationalism back home. African cities thus serve as nerve centers for Africa's societies.

EDUCATION. Western education has probably been the most significant force in the social and political development of contemporary Africa. Before European contact only three languages out of some 700 different tongues had a written script. The ability to read and write has brought formerly nonliterate peoples into contact with western views regarding science, technology, and the idea of progress. And with the learning of new skills, a growing number of Africans can now satisfy rising aspirations.

European education has provided a *lingua franca* (common language) to formerly polyglot communities. Because of the great variety of languages and dialects found within individual states in Africa and because of the lack of written languages, African states tend to adopt the language of the colonial power as their national tongue. For example, English is the official language of Ghana whereas French is officially spoken in the Republic of Mali.

Most important, western education has armed Africa's leaders with incentives and organizational techniques to challenge European dominance. And Africa's leaders have rapidly assumed the responsibilities of self-government.

POLITICAL CHANGE. With few exceptions, the partition of Sub-Saharan Africa resulted in the creation of artificial territories. When a European nation assumed control of an area in Africa, large numbers of tribes were usually grouped into territorial units which could be more easily governed by the colonial power. Regardless of the form of European administration, the overall effect was the same: the political influence of chieftaincy and other types of traditional leadership became subordinate as new systems of government, law, and administration were created.

From these arbitrarily established territories have emerged the contemporary states and countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite their synthetic creation, these states should no longer be regarded as purely artificial. Distinct communication systems and administrative organizations have developed within them. Moreover, the economic and social development which has taken place within each territory has given these states a sense of unique national history. Africans are beginning to think and act as Ghanaians, Kenyans, or Nigerians.

In the following chapters we shall consider some of the major problems of nation-building. But first let us take a look at some of the policies of the colonial powers which have helped to shape so much of contemporary Africa.

BRITISH POLICY. British policies and practices stressed the individuality of each

African territory. Consequently, even though Britain introduced similar parliamentary institutions into all territories under British rule, each territory developed distinct legislative and executive bodies, laws, and financial and administrative systems.

Unlike most colonial powers the British did not envisage African territories becoming coequal overseas territories of the mother country, but intended eventually to make each country self-governing. Before World War II, however, self-government and independence were considered very remote possibilities—something belonging to the distant future. The only exceptions to this unwritten policy were the Union of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where there were relatively large European populations. The British granted internal self-government to South Africa in 1910 and to Southern Rhodesia in 1923, but in both cases the electorate was almost entirely European.

Before World War II social and economic development was largely financed from local funds in each territory. In British West Africa, Uganda, and the Sudan, African commercial agriculture was actively encouraged; in Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, European private enterprise played the larger role in economic development.

Africans held only minor political positions in legislative organs of government in British West Africa, and few Africans held posts in the higher administrative services.

POSTWAR REFORMS. After World War II British policy accepted the idea of self-government under parliamentary democratic institutions. A program of large-scale

economic and social aid was established to provide a foundation for political advance. African representation in the central legislature and executive organs rapidly increased, and systems of democratic local government were started in urban and rural areas. Moreover the number of Africans holding higher civil service positions increased steadily.


In West Africa rapid political development has led to the independence of Ghana (1957), Nigeria (1960), and Sierra Leone (1961). Political advancement was not as rapid in British East and Central Africa, where many problems arose from the conflicting interests of the African majority and the European and Asian minorities. Nevertheless Tanganyika became independent in December, 1961; Uganda became independent on October 9, 1962; Kenya on December 12, 1963; Nyasaland (now Malawi) on July 6, 1964; Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) on October 24, 1964; and Gambia on February 18, 1965.

FRENCH POLICY AND PRACTICES.

French policy stressed legal, cultural, political, and constitutional bonds between France and its African territories. Before World War II French policy was generally authoritarian, and social and political advance proceeded slowly. Participation in social and political institutions was limited to a small number of Africans who had assimilated French culture. In fact, adoption of French culture rather than self-government was the goal of French policy.

TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. The Constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946) heralded a new era for French-speaking Africans. Citizenship was granted to all, and prewar systems of summary justice and

COLONIAL AFRICA: 1914



By permission: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher.

forced labor were abolished. The centralization of political power in Paris continued, but a new element was added. African representatives sat in French national institutions, as well as in the territorial and central institutions of the Federations of French West and Equatorial Africa. Following World War II, voting privileges and freedom of political activity were steadily expanded.

Like Britain, France indicated a willingness to use French taxpayers' money for the social and economic development of its territories. In French-speaking West and Equatorial Africa, France has in recent years spent hundreds of millions of dollars on economic assistance.

The *Loi Cadre* of 1956 marked another crucial change in French policy. It provided for the development of African legislative and executive institutions in each of

the twelve French territories. The *Loi Cadre* paved the way for internal self-government of each territory separately under the Fifth Republic of France. Apart from Guinea, which chose immediate political independence in 1958, the other eleven West and Equatorial territories became independent in 1960, but continued to maintain close cultural and economic relations with France.

BELGIAN POLICY AND PRACTICES.

Events in the Congo since independence in June, 1960, have cast a long shadow over Africa and the world, and the expression "another Congo" has come to stand for disorder and disintegration wherever they occur. To explain events in the Congo, a fuller treatment of which occurs on page 33, we need to understand the policies of Belgian colonial rule.

Until the late 1950's, the Belgian government believed that expert administration could control political growth. Belgium did not have a philosophy such as Britain's doctrine of developing national, self-governing institutions or France's emphasis on the integration of French Africa with metropolitan France. Instead Belgian policy was one of economic and cultural paternalism.

Under a system of paternalism, the Belgian government tried to correct the rampant commercial exploitation perpetrated by Belgians at the turn of the nineteenth century. Through long-range and carefully planned programs, Belgium systematically developed the rich economic resources of this vast territory. Its aim was not to turn the Africans into Belgians. Instead the Belgian government hoped to create a prosperous Congolese artisan and middle class involved in mining, cash cropping, and in-

dustry. Under the aegis of the Belgian government, roads, port facilities, railroads, and cities were built.

Nevertheless, despite a relative degree of material well-being and economic prosperity, the Africans enjoyed little social or political freedom. They were not allowed to organize and publicize African political opinion. And they were given almost no opportunities for higher education. During the 1950's, Belgian policy took a new shift and tried to foster the concept of a Belgo-Congolese community. A modest step towards political advancement was taken in 1957 and 1958, when Africans elected certain councillors in the larger cities of the Congo.

The Belgian Declaration of January 13, 1959, ushered in a new policy designed to lead the Congo to self-government in some four years. However under the mounting pressures of Congolese nationalism and external events, Belgium decided to grant full independence to the Congo on June 30, 1960.

PORTUGUESE POLICY AND PRACTICES.

Except for South Africa and Rhodesia (see Chapter 8), the only territories remaining under colonial rule in Subsaharan Africa are the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese and Spanish Guinea.

Constitutionally, both the Portuguese and Spanish governments regard their overseas territories as an integral part of the mother country. Thus they oppose self-government for these territories and attempt to bring them into even closer association with the mother country.

At present Africans in Portuguese and Spanish territories receive few opportuni-

ties for secondary education. Lack of education, general administrative practices, and limited economic growth have greatly restricted African development.

Portugal itself is relatively isolated from the democratic processes of the West and we can expect that changes in Portugal, as well as pressure from the liberation movements, will lead to greater democracy in the African states.

EVOLVING NATIONS. The establishment of arbitrary territories, the impact of the West, and colonial policies and practices have all been instruments in forming the present independent states of Sub-Saharan Africa. But Africans did not remain passive under colonialism.

Individually and collectively they responded to new forms of education, new economic activities, and new ways of engaging in politics. This response has been twofold. Ideologically it has asserted the fundamental equality and dignity of the Africans. Politically it has demanded freedom and an end to inequality in political, legal, and constitutional relations with European powers or settlers.

In its rejection of European domination and intrusion, African nationalism ranges from early resistance movements—such as the Ashanti wars in Ghana in the nineteenth century, or the Maji Maji rebellion in Tanganyika in opposition to German rule—to the mass political and social movements of the postwar years. Before World War II most African leaders looked for gradual reform through petitions and delegations to the colonial authorities. Since the War, however, leaders have sought a rapid transfer of political power to Africans through the organization of mass move-

"The non-alignment road"



LePelley in *The Christian Science Monitor*.

ments such as the Tanganyika African National Union, the Convention Peoples Party of Ghana, the Democratic Party of Guinea, or the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroun.

These contemporary political associations are led by educated leaders who are passionately committed to the idea of progress. Moreover Africa's young leaders are opposed to either alien or traditional authorities who may argue for a more gradual or orderly evolution of power.

African nationalism has used a number of ideas and political ideologies in its search for freedom and human dignity. It has asserted the primacy of politics in the attainment of its objectives. For without political power, Africans would continue to have a subordinate role in Africa and would remain excluded from equal participation in the world community. African leaders have

appealed to world public opinion and the universal applicability of the "inalienable rights of man." Moreover they have countered arguments that Africans are without a history or heritage of their own. In this respect African nationalism has fostered a cultural renaissance in its search for Africa's historical continuity, its distinctive personality, and national identity.

In territories where legitimate channels of political expression have been either denied or seriously restricted, the African political response has taken the form of conspiratorial organizations, independent African churches, economic boycotts, or terrorist movements. African separatist or independent churches have great historical importance as movements to assert African independence of Europeans. These churches have existed in large numbers in the politically restricted areas of central and southern Africa. The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya was another expression of African nationalism in a colonial situation that failed to recognize the need for immediate social and political reform.

MAJOR CHALLENGES. Africa is now clearly determined to shape its own future. In this endeavor the peoples of Africa have four momentous aspirations and challenges. These are

1. *National unity*: to inculcate into their peoples a sense of national identity and to build healthy and permanent institutions for their national unity;

2. *Economic and social development*: to conquer the triple enemies of poverty, ignorance, and disease;

3. *Racial and democratic equality*: to bring to an end white, minority rule in Southern Africa; and

4. *Pan-African integration*: to foster closer unity among all the independent states of continental Africa.


Africans want to achieve all of these goals, even though they are neither easily attainable nor necessarily compatible with each other. Moreover, as we have seen, Africa is a continent of great diversity in population, of uneven social and political development, and of varying endowments in natural resources. Therefore the struggles are not identical in all countries. They vary according to the physical and historical environment, the cultural and racial makeup of each territory, and the character of the western impact.

Let us now turn to look at each of these challenges—national unity, economic development, equality, and Pan-Africanism—in greater detail.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. What kinds of problems arise when Africans begin to move from rural areas to cities? Do these resemble the problems Americans faced during large-scale urbanization? What factors might make the move from country to city more disruptive in Africa than in the United States? What factors might make the transition smoother?

2. Judging from political conditions in presentday Africa, which of the excolonial powers seem to have done the best job of paving the way for African independence?



The Crisis of National Unity

6

The departure of the colonial powers that has taken place throughout most of Subsaharan Africa brings new confidence and exhilaration to the African peoples of these new states. But to raise a new flag and to create a nation are two quite different things. The departure of the colonial powers brings into sharp focus the enormous problems of nation-building confronting the new African states. No one is more conscious of the fact that political independence alone does not ensure the existence of a developing and stable nation than the African leaders themselves. The prospects of democratic government depend in large measure on whether the challenge of creating national unity can be successfully met.

The new African leadership inherits enormous problems. Their countries are desperately poor, communications are inadequate, the administrative apparatus of the new states lacks qualified African personnel, new structures have to be created to deal with such problems as foreign policy (previously handled by the colonial power), and new relationships must be defined between central and local government or between government and subnational groups such as trade unions and missionary churches. But by far the most important problem facing African leaders—and on the solution of which all others depend—is to foster a new sense of national allegiance; to teach their people that independence entails duties as well as privileges; and to create a nation out of diverse peoples united only in their desire for freedom from alien rule.

In their quest for a new national cohesion, African leaders often appear to Americans to have exaggerated the need for consolidating their power: In the name of unity, some states have banned all effective opposition groups and embraced a political philosophy which is essentially authoritarian. In replying to such criticism, African leaders

assert that critical situations demand extreme solutions. They argue that, just as peoples of western states accept infringements on their liberty in time of emergency—wars, depressions, or natural disasters—so do African peoples accept limitation of individual liberty as a price worth paying for national stability and progress. The alternative, they argue, is to see their newly won freedom disappear in tribal chaos, economic disaster, and new forms of imperialism.

But the growth of concentrated central power and the rise of single-party states are not caused by independence alone; their roots go deep into the colonial past. We should remember that most of the history of colonialism is a history of authoritarian rule. Colonial powers established the "Rule of Law," but it was a law imposed from above rather than a law initiated by the people. The administrative officers were responsible to a colonial governor appointed by the metropolitan country, and the legislatures, which were usually controlled by government-appointed officials, had the task of merely advising rather than ordering the executive. Furthermore African leaders in the preindependence period were not accustomed to the concept of a "loyal" opposition to colonial rule. Whenever they raised opposition, they were usually treated as "agitators," and colonial governors were equipped with special powers to restrict their activities. Restriction (detention without trial), deportation, and the banning of political parties were techniques frequently used against the nationalist movements and their leaders. Thus the political experience of African leaders differs radically from that of western leaders. It would be almost impossible for an American who had served

a prison sentence to become President, but many, if not most, of the African leaders are "prison graduates" (for example, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Hastings Banda of Malawi, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana).

The very nature of African nationalism also tended to concentrate power and to justify undemocratic measures. We must remember that African political parties (except in the terminal phases of colonialism) came into existence to oppose colonial rule, not to advocate different policies for the colonial power to follow. Initially political parties lacked cohesion and effective organization and tended to split along ethnic lines or to become the political machines of individuals. The colonial powers could, and frequently did, promote these divisions in order to "divide and rule." Africans soon discovered that only strictly enforced unity could lead to effective opposition to the colonial powers. Splinter groups and factions thus came to be regarded by the African majority parties as traitorous to the cause of independence. This feeling persists into the postindependence period, and there is usually little popular protest when African governments take steps to abolish opposition parties and perpetuate one-party rule.

African leaders advance further justifications for centralizing power and consolidating single parties. They believe that democracy can take place *within* the single party; that opposition parties detract from the national effort at social and economic development; and that opposition parties are "European," while single parties are in line with African tradition—since, in the traditional past, organized opposition parties did not exist.

But beyond these rationalizations and assertions lie even more tangible factors. In African countries the governments can dispense enormous patronage; thus the party which controls the government also controls much of the country's economy and can demand loyalty to the party as the price of getting a job, either in the government or in business. By extending patronage to much of the economy, the ruling party has an immense advantage over its competitors, who have few economic rewards with which to perpetuate party loyalty. Second, the dominant party in most African states has arranged election procedures so as to hinder the operation of opposition parties; in many cases opposition parties, especially the Communist parties of the new states, have been outlawed. Finally, African leaders argue that in a continent in which per capita income is approximately \$100, compared to around \$2000 in the United States, opposition parties with salaried representatives are a needless luxury.

TRIBAL DIFFERENCES. The tendencies to centralize power, to adopt authoritarian measures, and to perpetuate the rule of nationalist elites are also products of serious divisive tendencies that exist in the new states. A major source of disunity is political tribalism. Each state is composed of many tribal groupings which display a diversity of languages, values, institutions, and attitudes. Such diversity—much like that existing in our own country—enriches the culture of a nation, but can produce dangerous schisms. When people regard their parochial, familial, or ethnic ties as having a prior claim on their allegiance to the nation, they may be prepared to destroy

“ . . . anyway, Europe, you haven't always been a model driver, either!”




Cummings in *The Daily Express*, London.

their political union (as was the case with the southern states in our Civil War).

Tribal animosities that lay dormant under the stabilizing influence of colonial governments have occasionally come to life in the new states. In Kenya, for example, a proposal was advanced to form an alliance of the smaller Kenyan tribes (the Kenya African Democratic Union), split off from the rest of the Kenya state, and create an independent republic from their tribal territory. A better-known example of political tribalism is provided by the postindependence anarchy in the Congo.

RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES. In many states governments must not only weld tribal groups into a common loyalty, they must also find a way in which different patterns of religion can exist harmoniously within a single state. The Sudanese government is

CULTURAL AND REGIONAL OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION



one which must face this problem. Of the ten million people who live in the Sudan, about seven million speak Arabic. The "Arabic" peoples are divided into two Islamic sects—Ansar and Khatmiya. Each sect has been associated with a different political party.

Approximately three million Nilotic peoples live in the southern part of the Sudan. In contrast to the northern Sudanese, the Nilotic peoples have their own tribal religions. Moreover the Nilotic peoples have not forgotten Arab slave trading, and their deep resentment of Arab ways continues to create tensions in the Sudan. This conflict brought a military dictatorship to power in 1958; but in attempting to reconcile people of different religions, languages, and social patterns in Sudan, the military regime itself incurred the dissatisfaction of all groups in Sudan and was overthrown in 1964.

IRREDENTISM. Another source of conflict is irredentism—the desire for unification among tribes and peoples divided by political boundaries. A very large number of African tribes today find themselves di-

vided by state borders; and attempts to unite these divided tribes, and resistance to these attempts, could be an important source of instability. One situation of this type concerns the Ewe peoples, who are divided between Ghana and Togoland. There is also a movement to unify the Bakonga, who live in northern Angola, the Congo (Leopoldville), and the Congo (Brazzaville).

The movement to unify the Somali people in the (eastern) Horn of Africa is still another example of irredentism. The Somalis are Muslim nomads who have been divided among the British, Italian, and French Somalilands, eastern Ethiopia, and northern Kenya. Approximately half of the three million Somali peoples live in Somalia. Since independence in 1960, Somalia has campaigned for annexing the parts of northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia most heavily populated with Somalis.

EXPERIMENT IN FEDERALISM. In a few African states, attempts have been made to overcome these problems not by concentrating power at the center but by using the American solution of political federation. All of the elements we have mentioned thus far—tribalism, heterogeneous patterns of culture and religion, a variety of political and social institutions, and experiences—are found in Nigeria. Nigeria hopes to bridge these problems and unite its 40 million people through federalism.

The Federation of Nigeria is composed of four regions: East, West, Mid-West, and North. Each of these regions enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy (self-government) and within each region one tribe is politically dominant. The Yoruba have power in the West, the Ibo in the East, and

the Hausa-Fulani in the North, while no group dominates the Mid-West. Here the term "tribe" is somewhat misleading. Both the Yoruba and Ibo number over five million, and the Hausa peoples are considerably larger, outnumbering the Yoruba and Ibo combined.

The principal conflict in Nigeria has been between the northern region and the two coastal regions. Unlike the Yoruba and the Ibo, the Hausa-Fulani people of the north are Islamic. The Hausa-Fulani have had less intense contact with the West, and their region is not as developed as the south. Also the Northern Nigerians have been governed by hereditary Emirs (Hausa-Fulani Muslims) with extensive powers. Despite the establishment of parliamentary democratic institutions in the north, the Emirs continue to wield considerable influence and power.

SOUTHERN NIGERIA. The dominant southern tribes, Yoruba and Ibo, have long had contact with the West, since living in the coastal regions gave them considerable access to the outside world. Today the main educated classes of Nigeria come from the south. Democratic institutions have taken root in the two southern regions to a far greater degree than in the north. And it is in the south that one finds political parties that are more competitive and more active.

Even though they outnumber the southern peoples, the northern Hausa-Fulani have feared that they will be dominated by the more aggressive, energetic, and western-educated politicians of the south. Their distrust of the southerners has led the Hausa-Fulani leaders to seek a federal system of government through which each re-

gion would be largely autonomous, within which they would be certain to retain control over their own affairs.


REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO. Probably no other new nation in Africa faces greater problems in nation-building than does the (ex-Belgian) Republic of the Congo. As we have seen, Belgian policy prevented the organization of national movements, which might have united the country. Also, the Belgian government refused to create national legislative institutions in which Congolese might have learned the skills of self-government. Equally important, the Belgian administration provided almost no opportunity for higher education.

Yet the Congo, given no chance to prepare for self-government, plunged abruptly from a rigid colonial administration into full independence in the space of two years. When Belgium pulled out, there were no Congolese doctors, engineers, or army officers. And only twelve Congolese had administrative positions in the civil service. Yet the Congolese had to run a complex political system, draft a constitution for the country, and maintain the economy with a few trained personnel.

It is difficult enough for a nation which is strongly united to overcome severe political and economic problems. But, for a country such as the Congo, which is torn by tribal and regional differences, the challenges are awesome.

The Congolese are divided into 200 tribes, speaking 38 main languages. There have been serious divisions between African leaders who have supported a closely united Congo and regional and tribal leaders who seek a considerable degree of local autonomy.

THE CONGO CRISIS



By permission: *The New York Times*.

The United States, the United Nations, and most African states have supported the concept of a united Congo in the belief that it offers the best prospect for stability and the well-being of its population. The six provinces of the Congo are being reorganized into some 21 regions which will be constituent units of the new federal constitution.

However the unification of the Congo has yet to be achieved, since its territorial integrity and the authority of the central government are continually being challenged and threatened by separatist and rebel forces. Moise Tshombe, Premier of the Congo, has been able to rally little African support for his program of unification, primarily because of his use of white mercenary troops. His difficulties are compounded by the dangers of big-power intervention on the part of Red China, the

Soviet Union, and the United States. Before a stable and unified Congo can be established, the Congo will have to grapple with the multiple problems of internal weakness, Cold War extension, and lack of African consensus concerning the best way to achieve political integration.

NEW SOURCES OF CONFLICT. While recognizing the dangers of political tribalism, religious differences, and irredentism in independent Africa, we should not overlook other sources of conflict arising among the groups that produced nationalist movements: the trade unions, the army, the students, the political left-wing, and the bureaucracy. In the preindependence period, the relationship between these social groups and the political leadership was a fluid one. Not only were many of its leaders co-opted into the leadership of the nationalist movements, but, moreover, groups such as student organizations, trade unions, and veterans organizations at times took the initiative in the multilateral attack on the colonial power. In the postindependence period, however, the leaders of the nationalist movements who assume the reins of power find themselves faced with the problem of defining a new relationship with these groups. The technique generally used inside the one-party, centralized states is to attempt to "politicize" these groups: that is, to make their policies and leaders subservient to the national interest as defined by the government leadership. Thus we see independent states taking measures to outlaw strikes and appointing politicians to top professional posts in the civil service and in the army.


Though Africa's leaders are aware of these problems, their states are fragile, and

there have been frequent cases in which such subnational groups have challenged the political elite: for example, the murder of President Olympio in Togo by the army in 1962, the general strike in Brazzaville which led to the deposition of Abbé Youlou, and the student demonstrations in the Sudan in 1964.

AFRICAN SOCIALISM. The ideology of “nationalism,” though essential to the liberation struggle, creates severe problems in the postindependence era. Nationalism is an expansive ideology, broadening the horizons of the people, promising greater affluence with independence, and legitimizing attacks on the colonial governments and their administrators. Today African leaders fill governmental positions, and the task of nation-building requires not merely obedience to the decisions of the leaders but respect for the offices they fill; not merely a continuation of daily work but an intensification of the spirit of sacrifice.

To generate this new spirit, African leaders have created the concept of African socialism. African socialism is an attempt to weld the spirit of cooperation in the African tribe and kinship unit to the new tasks ahead. While rejecting political tribalism, African socialism appeals to those aspects of the tribal past—particularly the deep sense of cooperation—that can unify the people. While African socialism is still a diffuse ideology, bearing small resemblance to “scientific socialism” (communism), it does represent an attempt by the new states to unify their people, generate enthusiasm for new policies, create a spirit of cooperation and self-sacrifice, and to show the outside world that Africa has unique values and ideas to offer.

“Puzzle”



Britte in *Rhein-Neckar Zeitung*, Heidelberg.

PAN-AFRICANISM. In addition to the search for unity within each African state, most African leaders since independence have expressed the desire for some kind of unification of all the African states, to strengthen the African continent and protect its freedom.

In West Africa, the Ghana-Guinea Union, initiated in 1958 and expanded in 1961 to include Mali, was the first attempt by independent African states to implement the vision of African unification. While not having advanced beyond being a loosely structured alliance, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union regarded itself for a time as a core area for a larger union of African states.

Another important attempt at union in West Africa was the Mali Federation (Senegal and Mali), which collapsed in the summer of 1960. It had as its objective the reconstitution of French-speaking West Africa into a federation associated with France in a commonwealth of states. More successful has been the Sehel-Benin Union, led by the Ivory Coast, which encompasses the Republic of Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey. In Central Africa, the states of the former French Equatorial Africa have created a customs union, which has been joined by Cameroun.

The problem of competing schemes of unification, differences in language, trade, and monetary relations, and other factors such as distances, uneven levels of economic development, and fears of being dominated by the political groups of another state, pose critical obstacles to the prospects of regional unification in West Africa.

A major step towards African integration was taken at a meeting of the Heads of State of African countries held in Addis Ababa in May, 1963. At this meeting a permanent organization of African States was established (the Organization of African Unity), and a charter was presented for ratification by each of the participating countries. The Charter of the OAU sets forth four main objectives: (1) peaceful settlement of intra-African disputes; (2) the liberation of Southern Africa; (3) regional economic cooperation; and (4) acceptance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the African states.

We have already seen how irredentism produces a grave danger of border conflicts between the African states. One purpose of the OAU is to establish machinery for the

peaceful settlement of such disputes through conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. This machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes was used in 1963 to arrange a cease-fire between Algeria and Morocco, who disputed ownership of wells along their common frontier. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was instrumental in arranging mediation through Mauritania, and Mauritanian and Ethiopian officers supervised withdrawal behind an agreed cease-fire line.

The OAU is unanimous in its opposition to continued minority rule in Southern Africa and to Portuguese colonialism in Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique. The conference established a "Liberation Committee" of the foreign ministers of nine African states with the task of coordinating measures taken by the African states to liberate the countries of Southern Africa. The Liberation Committee has a permanent secretariat in Dar es Salaam, the capital of Tanzania, from which it channels aid to liberation movements, persuades rival liberation movements to cooperate and, where necessary, recommends recognition of governments-in-exile by the African states. The OAU also agreed on sanctions against South Africa and Portugal that include denial of fly-over rights, port facilities, and trade between Southern Africa and members of the OAU.

The OAU represents a turning point on the question of establishing a United States of Africa. According to one school of thought, African states should proceed rapidly towards this goal by creating a strong political federation of African states. Its protagonists argue that if the African states delay in establishing a strong federal union,

the countries of Africa will tend to drift apart and establish mutually antagonistic regional blocs. Another school of thought favors a gradual approach, whereby African states would form regional links and federations where these are economically viable, thus laying a firm foundation for a united Africa. The OAU represents a victory for the gradualists: it is less of a federation than an international organization comparable to the United Nations, based on the principle of the territorial sovereignty of the states which make up the organization.


FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. To what extent can the difficulties of African nations in achieving unity be at-

tributed to the policies of colonial powers? To what extent are they the result of indigenous African conditions, such as tribal factionalism? Discuss some of the methods African leaders are now employing to foster national unity.

2. Does western democracy seem to be workable in new African nations? Or do one-party states offer the only way out of Africa's difficulties?

3. What obstacles stand in the way of a large-scale federation of African states? Can the differences among African states be compared to the disparities of the American colonies before the American Revolution?



Productivity and Progress

7

Bold and imaginative policies are required not only to achieve political stability, but also to develop these new African states economically. African leaders readily admit that tremendous social and economic problems confront them. Moreover African leaders argue, as others do, that the main hope for stability and democracy lies in rapid economic progress and social betterment.

Although Africa is considered the least developed continent, considerable economic progress has taken place during the past twenty years. As we have seen, through the expansion of commercial agriculture and the establishment of local industries and processing plants, a market economy has gradually developed. Also governments have spent large sums of money in their development plans for expansion of education, urban housing, and particularly communications.

Despite this postwar economic progress, the basic problem of development remains: *How can African leadership overcome Africa's low level of productivity and achieve a real breakthrough to a modern technological economy?*

At present Africa's agricultural economies are characterized by many weaknesses. Most of these states still depend on a small number of export cash crops. Ghana depends on cocoa for about 80 per cent of its revenue; Liberia about 70 per cent on rubber; Ethiopia and Eritrea approximately 60 per cent on coffee; Nigeria about 68 per cent on cocoa, peanuts, and palm products; Somalia over 60 per cent on fresh fruits and nuts; Sudan about 60 per cent on cotton; and Cameroun about 67 per cent on cocoa and coffee.

A single crop economy is usually a fragile economy. It is weak or fragile for several reasons. Since agricultural products are vulnerable to a number of crop diseases, the mainstay of a country's economy can virtually be wiped out by one blight or a bad year. Also these coun-

tries have only limited internal markets; that is, local citizens do not buy enough goods and services to support the national economy. Thus these countries depend almost entirely upon world commodity prices for their revenue. If, for example, the world price of cocoa should plummet to almost nothing, Ghana would forfeit its major source of income.

ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES. It should also be noted that a country with a single crop economy often sells the major portion of its produce to one or two countries. Thus it becomes economically dependent upon a few purchasers. The temptation exists for the "market nations" who hold the purse strings to exert political controls as well as economic pressures on the single crop country.

Countries with an abundant supply of mineral resources do not face quite such serious problems as those states with agricultural economies. Copper, lead, diamonds, manganese, cobalt, aluminum, uranium, and other strategic materials are in large demand. And they provide a major source of revenue for rapidly developing industrial economies of Southern African states. Recently, intensive efforts have been made to find and exploit mineral and metal resources elsewhere in Africa. Iron ore and bauxite have been found in West Africa, and the Sahara Desert is a potential source of oil.


Nevertheless, countries which depend upon a single mineral export are in somewhat the same situation as single crop economies. For they, too, are dependent upon world commodity prices. For example, the main export of Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) is copper. Thus the revenue its indus-

tries receive depends upon the going price of copper in the world market.

A SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY. Another serious weakness in African agricultural economies is the fact that large portions of the population are still engaged in subsistence agriculture. As we have seen, such production does not add to the quantity of goods available for export, nor do subsistence farmers contribute a local market for industry. Because the subsistence economy is a self-sufficient system, closely tied up with its own pattern of values, family organization, and obligations, many subsistence farmers resist any changes. Nevertheless the shift from subsistence farming to cash cropping must be speeded up if the new states are to earn foreign exchange and credit and to provide food for increasing numbers employed in towns and industries.

Merely switching to cash cropping, however, will not result in high economic development. At present, commercial agriculture remains at a low level of production. Few modern forms of technology or mechanization have been adopted. Farms are small, and the advantages of efficient and economical operation generally characteristic of large-scale farming have not been available. Consequently per capita productivity and per capita income remain low. Ghana, with one of the most prosperous economies, has a per capita income of only about \$150 per year.

Economic development also depends upon basic utilities and services. Many of Africa's new states lack good roads or transportation systems. Communication systems are generally inadequate, and electric power has only begun to be widely available.



Source: The AID Program.

OTHER NEEDS. Another major deficiency in most African countries is that only a small portion of the population is literate or has at best a primary education. Despite the fact that an ever growing number of Africans now attend schools, educational facilities in Africa are meager. In an effort to combat illiteracy, the development programs of most African states place major emphasis on education.

African states are handicapped not only by an insufficient number of educated leaders, skilled artisans, and managers, but also by the lack of an effective, locally recruited civil service. Many new African states have had to retain or hire European administrators and technicians.

A well-trained and competent administrative staff provides an important basis for national stability. Through government service the loyalty of Africans may be

focused on the national community rather than solely on local tribal interest. The many activities of a civil service bring greater numbers of the population into direct and immediate contact with the government. And national administrative systems help to familiarize people with new practices in various aspects of development from mass literacy to new methods of production.

ECONOMIC AIMS. Generalizing is always a hazardous undertaking, but we might briefly sum up the problems facing underdeveloped countries as follows: these states want a standard of living comparable to that which we enjoy in America. And they want it as soon as possible.

In order for a nation to become highly developed, it must have access to enough food to feed its population. In nonindustrial nations agricultural production should also be extensive enough so that surplus crops can be exported. Meanwhile industries have to be developed to produce manufactured goods for export and for local consumption. Internal markets need to be created. In other words citizens must earn sufficient wages to buy locally produced goods. Obviously factories must be set up so that those goods can be manufactured. Exports and local industry thus provide a nation with both external and internal sources of funds.

AGRICULTURE—A KEY. As a nation's industries grow, greater numbers of people must be diverted away from farming into manufacturing enterprises. The difficulty in achieving this, however, derives from the fact that people cannot be released for industry until food can be produced by a relatively small segment of the population. As


long as agricultural production requires the bulk of a nation's labor force, industries cannot thrive. For if a country attempted to develop extensive manufacturing enterprises and left agriculture at a subsistence level, how would the cities be supplied with food?

Thus a key question, influencing all aspects of economic development, is whether agriculture can be made more productive. Unless agricultural productivity increases, greater funds will not be available for education, for training administrative workers, for building transportation and communications systems, and for other vital needs. Moreover, without increased production and greater income, it is unlikely that even the basic needs of a growing population—food, shelter, clothing, and health—will be satisfied.

The paradox is that while larger revenues depend upon an increase in agricultural productivity, agriculture cannot become more productive unless more funds become available to spend on scientific research, equipment, fertilizers, tools, and agricultural training.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT. For a country to increase its wealth, a certain portion of the national income must be devoted to increasing its capital. Some money must be put aside for development and expansion instead of being spent for immediate needs. African states must, therefore, acquire enough revenue for “capital investment” as well as income to support their populations. African states now operate on a deficit; that is, they spend more money than they earn. Unless Africa can become self-sufficient enough to overcome its deficit and finance future development, not only will “rising

PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS



Source: Food Research Institute, 1958.

expectations” be frustrated, but population expansion will result in an even lower standard of living.

FOREIGN AID. Lacking internal revenue for capital investment, African states seek massive aid from the rest of the world. Unfortunately there are severe limitations on the use of private capital for development. Except for the development of mineral resources, the profit return is often not high enough and many investors regard the political conditions in Africa as too risky for long-term development. Another consideration prompting African leaders to seek public rather than private aid is that development is most urgently needed in those areas of economic growth which show least tangible returns—in education, in health and sanitation, and in communications and other community services. But most African governments seek to encourage private investors

by offering such inducements as light taxation, investment-guarantee, and guaranteed markets.

"NEO-COLONIALISM". One of the basic problems of African states is their constant struggle to limit the conditions attached to bilateral aid programs. If an African country accepts aid from an eastern or western nation, it becomes economically and politically involved with—and possibly dependent upon—the donor nation. For example, an agreement between an African state and the U.S. government to supply jet fighters means that the African state must continually purchase American spare parts. In the struggle between East and West (and between Russia and Communist China) economic aid has also become a political weapon. African states seek to maintain some freedom of maneuver by obtaining aid from East and West alike.

Moreover, African leaders are very conscious of the dangers of dependence on foreign aid. If foreign interests own and control major sectors of their economies, Africans can, despite political independence, control their destinies only in a very limited way. African leaders constantly refer to this danger by the term "neo-colonialism" (literally "new colonialism"). A good example of neo-colonialism was the influence of foreign mining interests over the government of Moise Tshombe in Katanga. During the attempted secession, mining companies provided the revenue which paid for nearly all the Katanga government's expenditures, particularly for the army and police which maintained Katanga's "independence." When the Congolese government, with U.N. support, sought economically to end Katanga's seces-

sion, the solution was to recapture the foreign currency earnings and the tax revenues of the large mining companies and pay them to the Leopoldville government. Though Tshombe was not a puppet of the foreign economic interests, he was certainly heavily dependent on them.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE. Although the African states are making some progress in improving living standards, they are not catching up with the developed states of the West. In fact the gap in average living standards between the people of Africa and the people of the United States is constantly growing. One explanation for this growing disparity between rich and poor states is the system of international trade. In conditions of international free trade, the new African producers cannot compete either at home or abroad with their American competitors for all the reasons we have examined—their unskilled labor, their lack of capital, machinery, and of technological "know-how." Thus free world markets tend to perpetuate the division into rich and poor states. For this reason African leaders favor the creation of new international trade regulations designed to counterbalance the inequities of the world market. At the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in the summer of 1964, African states joined with the rest of the underdeveloped world to demand new machinery, to stabilize prices for their exports, to ease restrictions on international credit, and to permit them to impose tariff walls on imports from the "developed" nations without suffering retaliatory action.

DEMOCRACY. The exact relationships between economic progress and democracy are not clear. Countries which become

highly developed economically do not necessarily encourage the growth of democracy. But, at the same time, it is unlikely that democratic values and institutions could flower in environments of continued poverty and large-scale illiteracy.

If African leaders fail to make headway in pressing economic and social programs, the path might be wide open for extremists or demagogues who have little concern with the welfare of the people.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. An American journalist has asked: "Can the popular government do the unpopular

thing?" What are some of the unpopular steps governments in Africa have to take in order to raise living standards and create national stability? Are there any unpopular steps our own government might have to take to ensure national security and promote world peace?

2. Should the United States attach conditions to the economic aid administered to Africa? Why might an African nation fear to accept aid from a western power more than she would fear to accept aid from China or the Soviet Union?



Race and Politics in Southern Africa

8

For most of Africa, white minority rule has ended. In much of Southern Africa, however, white oligarchical governments continue to wield power. Politically entrenched white resident populations control the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia. Angola and Mozambique are ruled by the government of Portugal. Despite differences in language, religious background, racial composition, historical tradition, state of economic development, and theories of government, these governments are alike in one overriding feature: their insistence that African advancement must not be allowed to displace established European supremacy.

These Europeans are determined to maintain their dominance in the face of rising expectations and demands by Africans for economic advancement, social equality, and a greater part in national government. Africa is a continent which has risen rapidly to independence, and demands for African freedom in these areas are being sharply expressed not only by independent Africa but also by much of the world at large. These demands also find a voice in nationalist organizations within these countries, and in boycotts, strikes, riots, and demonstrations, to mention only the more overt forms. In all of these remaining areas of European domination, authoritarian rule, together with the limited character of economic and social opportunities, has prompted nationalist activity and armed rebellion.

Each of these governments has evolved policies which provide for the subordination of the African majority population. These policies are "assimilation" in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, "apartheid" in South Africa, and "partnership" in Rhodesia. Although there are important differences in theory and in the manner in which these policies are being implemented, each policy is designed to insure the survival of European dominance.

PORTUGUESE POLICY. Portugal regards her colonies as integral parts of a united Portuguese state and nation. Political control of Angola (4,800,000), Mozambique (7,000,000), and Guinea (565,000) is centralized in Lisbon, and the administration in Africa is directly responsible to the Overseas Ministry of the Portuguese government. Within these overseas provinces, a hierarchy of Portuguese and subordinate “native” officials commanded, until recent years, thorough and effective control over the activities of the African population.

Portugal has conceived its mission as that of transplanting Portuguese culture into Angola and Mozambique, and thereby “civilizing” the African population. This vague, distant goal rejects racial and color prejudice. But the only road to advancement it leaves open for the African is to abandon his own culture and become a “Europeanized” African.

Until 1961, Portuguese policy divided the population into two categories—citizens and noncitizens. Both groups were members of one Portuguese state and nation, but they did not possess equal political, economic, or social rights. Those Africans who were fully assimilated in the view of the government—those who spoke Portuguese correctly, had an occupation in commerce or industry, or possessed property from which a living could be earned, and who also had adopted Portuguese ways of thinking—were known as *assimilados*. The *assimilados* were granted citizenship on the basis of full equality with “European” Portuguese.

THE INDIGENATO. Consequently, before 1961, the vast bulk of Africans in the Portuguese colonies—over 99 per cent—were

noncitizens and remained subject to a legal code called *indigenato*, which systematically regulated all the activities of nonassimilated Africans and provided arbitrary punishments for disobedience.


One of the most severe aspects of the *indigenato* has been an obligatory labor requirement under which the government was able to compel every African to work for six months each year. Every African had to carry an identity card and a pass book in which his movements and employment were recorded.

Until recently educational opportunities for Africans were extremely limited so that most Africans had no opportunity to become *assimilados*. Less than 2 per cent of the African children who managed to enroll in school finished even the “rudimentary” stage of education. A similar situation existed in Mozambique. The number of Africans who managed to enter the higher schools, or commerce and technical schools, was negligible.

By limiting opportunities for the development of an educated leadership group, and by following a systematic policy of repression, banishment of “cultural undesirables,” and isolation of Africans from western liberal institutions and thought, the Portuguese hoped to maintain their authoritarian rule.

AFRICAN RESPONSE. Despite these policies, Africans in the Portuguese territories have become increasingly vocal in their demands for political independence. Armed rebellion has flared in tiny Portuguese Guinea since 1962, and in Angola since 1961, where the first few months of fighting resulted in the killing of at least 20,000 Africans and 1000 Portuguese. In each of

" . . . This is a museum, not a workshop!"



Miguel in *The Tarentel Press*.

these territories, the rebels have broadened their efforts into guerrilla warfare and have attempted to establish national independence parties. An Angolan government-in-exile exists in the (Leopoldville) Congo, while in Mozambique an independence movement is organizing and has threatened forceful action. In addition to drawing on the sympathy of Africans in the territories, the nationalist movements have drawn some measure of support for their cause from other African states, from the United Nations, and from world powers.

Despite this tide of opposition, the Portuguese plan to stay as rulers in Africa, and have adopted an increasingly militaristic policy. Thousands of new troops have been sent to quell the revolts, and immigration of Portuguese citizens to Africa has been encouraged. At the same time some plans have been adopted which try to meet, in part, the Africans' demands. Programs of increased economic and educational development have been undertaken, and in 1961, a Portuguese declaration granted

citizenship to all Africans, thereby abolishing the *indigenato*. Yet progress has been slow; stability has already been upset by African demands for independence, and the future of Portuguese rule in Africa is in serious doubt.

SOUTH AFRICA: APARTHEID. Since World War II South Africa has become the symbol of doctrines and practices of human inequality. The racial policy of the South African ruling party—the National Party—has been roundly condemned. The United States firmly supports the United Nations view that “apartheid is a flagrant violation of the sacred trust which permeates the Mandate and the Charter of the United Nations.”

Before we examine the specific aspects of apartheid, let us review the present status of South Africa. The population in South Africa is approximately 16,000,000, including about 11,000,000 Africans, 3,000,000 Europeans, 1,500,000 Coloureds (peoples of racial mixtures who do not have any indigenous culture), and 500,000 Asians.

Many of the farmers, miners, and industrialists of presentday South Africa are descendants of the Dutch who settled there in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They call themselves Afrikaners and speak a language derived from Dutch called Afrikaans. English-speaking people constitute roughly 40 per cent of the European population.

BRITISH-BOER RIVALRY. A history of bitter conflict has conditioned relations between the British and the Afrikaners. Memories of British dominance in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the struggle of the Afrikaner people to achieve cultural and political eminence have been

major themes in South African history. Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking elements of the European population continue to disagree over certain political issues.

In 1948, the Afrikaner community succeeded in obtaining a Parliamentary majority for their party—the National Party—and, with a constant increase in strength, this party has been entrenched ever since. In 1960, despite the opposition of English-speaking peoples, the Afrikaners voted to make South Africa into a Republic. This change of status led to the Union's withdrawal from the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1961.

Nevertheless any animosity which results from other political disputes does not prevent basic agreement and support by the overwhelming majority of the white population—whether English-speaking or Afrikaner—for policies of separation and subordination.

NATIONALIST PARTY VIEWS. The Afrikaner Nationalists believe that Africans possess entirely different customs, values, and patterns of behavior from those of the white man. Moreover Afrikaners claim that Africans are culturally, morally, and intellectually incapable of participating on a basis of equality with Europeans in a modern western society. Since their rise to power in 1948, the Nationalists have imposed a more thorough, precise, and rigid system of separation and more rigorous control of non-European life than formerly existed under joint English-Afrikaner political parties.

A basic consideration behind the present government's policies is the fear of being swamped by sheer weight of numbers. Europeans are convinced that South Africa is

a white man's country. Some can trace their ancestry to the first settlers in the seventeenth century, and many families have been in South Africa for generations. They look upon themselves as the pioneers and founders of the South African state. Consequently the Europeans feel that only they have the full right to possess the vast majority of land, exploit its resources, and govern its peoples.

In a desperate attempt to maintain their supremacy, the Europeans have used their political institutions—parliament, the legal system, and the civil service—to keep the African community in a position of separateness and subordination. Many critics of apartheid have argued that one of the tragedies of South Africa is the increasing distortion of democratic principles and institutions.

TERRITORIAL SEGREGATION. The South African government believes that racial separation should be established on both a social and a territorial basis. Separate political and geographical areas would be reserved for Europeans and Africans. Each group would control the political, economic, and social activities within its own area. The European community, however, would continue to maintain absolute dominance of some 87 per cent of the country. The Bantu (African) population would possess the rights of ownership and control of the remaining 13 per cent, divided into "Bantustans," or self-governing African territories. The Bantustans could ultimately achieve independence, but would remain under European supervision in the immediate future. The first African territorial parliament has already been established in the Transkei reserved area.

The industrialization of South Africa, however, has made complete territorial separation of Europeans and Africans impractical. More than half of the African population, some five million, live in the European sectors where they work as low paid laborers on European owned mines, farms, and factories. These workers are vital to the industrialized economy of South Africa. Should these Africans be transferred to the African reserved areas, the Europeans would be deprived of their major source of labor. Moreover the meager economies of the reserved areas could not support them.

POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS. For those Africans who live in the European sectors of South Africa, apartheid means white supremacy. The African worker is regarded as a visitor despite his place of birth or length of residence. Apartheid deprives him of social and political rights and of any effective part in national government. The other non-Europeans—Asians and Coloureds—are also subject to forms of discrimination.

The following are some of the specific measures which have been taken during recent years to restrict the non-European.

A series of acts culminating in the "Separate Representation of Voters Bill" (1956) has disenfranchised all non-Europeans from common voting rolls. Other political rights such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly have been severely curtailed.

The "Industrial Conciliation Act" and the "Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act" (1953), deny legal recognition to African Trade Unions, forbid strikes, and seek to provide governmental control over the settlement of African labor disputes. Other laws make it a criminal offense

for the African to leave his job, and set African wages at poverty levels.


The "Reservation of Separate Amenities Act" (1953) provides a legal basis for separate and inferior facilities for non-Europeans in transportation, hotels, and other public facilities. The ultimate objective of the "Bantu Education Act" (1953) is to prepare Africans for opportunities in life in accordance with the policy of the state. Its critics argue that it lowers the quality of education available to Africans and deprives them of the cultural heritage of western civilization. Other parliamentary acts require non-Europeans to carry racial identification cards and passes which are used to regulate and check freedom of movement.

SOUTHWEST AFRICA. The policy of apartheid has been carried by the South African government into Southwest Africa, a territory given to South Africa as a mandate, or trust, at the end of World War I. South Africa has incorporated this area and has ruled it as an integral part of the country. The League of Nations first protested this incorporation, pointing out that such action violated the requirement that mandate territories be ruled in the interest of the native population. More recently the United Nations has also demanded that the area be considered a trust territory and be brought toward independence; African groups within Southwest Africa have demanded United Nations intervention; and the International Court of Justice has been asked to decide the legality of South Africa's claim to Southwest Africa. The South African government has consistently maintained that it has full legal control over the territory, and denies the right of any outside agency to settle the question.

AFRICAN REACTION. Apartheid policies have not been accepted willingly by Africans, but have been imposed without their consent. The resulting crisis deepens each year. In the High Commission Territories (enclaves within South Africa which are still under the control of Britain), African opinion rejects any possibility of future incorporation into South Africa and instead demands independence outside the South African government. And despite the economic dependence of two of the enclaves, Swaziland and Basutoland, on the South African economy, Great Britain is preparing these territories for full independence. Within South Africa two African nationalist parties have been outlawed and their leaders brought to trial; a riot in 1961 resulted in the killing of dozens of Africans, and a series of laws passed in 1962 and 1963 has greatly enlarged the scope of existing apartheid legislation. Under these conditions African opinion tends to become steadily more extreme and more determined to challenge the present social and political order.

CONTINUED STABILITY? At present the South African government maintains stability by means of an extensive and highly organized police force, political persecution, and repressive laws. In addition, since few economic resources are available to Africans outside the industrial economy, their livelihood depends on their jobs in the mines and on European farms. Under these circumstances it is extremely difficult to organize large-scale protest or reform movements. The African who rebels against the Europeans not only loses his job, but has no other means of making a living open to him. Finally, the government's policy of

RACIAL SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA




By permission: *The New York Times*.

building up self-governing and divided Bantu states obstructs African attempts to develop any overall national policy.

In the long run, however, the ability of the South African government to maintain stability through force and coercion is doubtful. An ever growing number of Africans feel that, since they are denied all legitimate channels for social and political reform, they must resort to violence. Boycotts, strikes, riots, and disorders all reveal mounting pressures for African participation and governmental reform. Although sudden revolution in South Africa is questionable, continued sporadic disorder may eventually explode into a major revolt.

ECONOMIC REALITIES. Moreover the government's willingness to pursue apartheid in flagrant disregard of sound economic practice seriously threatens economic growth and expansion. Inefficient and wasteful use of African labor and labor shortages slow up production. Artificially low African wages have prevented the development of large internal markets. A small domestic market exists, but until the African earns sufficient wages to buy locally

"But of course, some races are more colorful than others."



Valtman in *The Hartford Times*.

manufactured goods, a large-scale, self-supporting national economy cannot evolve. And the Europeans will continue to be dependent upon world prices for raw materials.

Overshadowing all political and economic factors is the momentum of militant African nationalism. Deep and growing bitterness against Europeans may eventually overcome all chances for peaceful or gradual change.

Moreover white South Africa is confronted with a mounting barrage of external pressures. An outraged world opinion, boycotts imposed on South African goods, growing demands for United Nations intervention, and influence exerted by private businessmen and individuals are major forces being brought to bear against white South Africa. Given these pressures, some people in South Africa are beginning to talk about genuine partition of the country as a final solution.

"WHITE" RHODESIA. The third government of Southern Africa which remains under white domination is that of Rhodesia. In that country today, a small European minority (225,000) rules over an overwhelming African majority (3,500,000), and is determined to maintain its position of superiority. African nationalist movements have been persecuted, moderate Europeans have been pushed out of political office, and demands for racial equality have been rejected by virtually all of the white community.

The explanation of this attitude lies in part in the country's history. The British settlers who moved into Rhodesia at the end of the last century encountered strong African resistance. As a result Rhodesia was both conquered and ruled by force. With the increased migration of Europeans to the area after World War I, England yielded to demands for European self-government and granted the territory the status of "self-governing colony" in 1923, with Europeans firmly in control of the government. Subsequently Rhodesia began to imitate the policies of the government of South Africa.

In 1953, Britain formed a Federation among Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Nyasaland (Malawi) to promote economic development and racial "partnership," and a central legislature was formed which included some African representation. Within a few years, however, it became clear to Africans that equality and true partnership would take decades in coming, and that African advance would be very slow. Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, who had always opposed a federation with


Southern Rhodesia, accelerated their campaign for the breakup of the Federation and the independence of their countries under African rule. By 1963, the end of the Federation was in sight, and multiracial partnership was a failure.

In 1964, both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia became independent states and adopted their African names (Malawi and Zambia, respectively). European political power remained entrenched in Rhodesia, however, and a struggle began between an African determination to achieve full social and political equality and a European effort to retain a privileged position. Fearful of being swamped by an African population which outnumbered them many times, "white" Rhodesia seeks full independence from Britain under a constitution granting them absolute control of the African population. Africans demand that Britain postpone independence until majority rule is

introduced to Rhodesia. The fundamental issue in Rhodesia is whether Europeans will recognize the need to build a common political system with Africans based on individual dignity and equality, or pay any price to resist African demands as South Africa and Portugal have chosen to do.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. What kinds of outside pressures are being brought to bear on the government of South Africa for internal reform? Which seems the most effective: economic boycott, world opinion, or the threat of UN intervention?
2. What factors might account for the fact that Portugal has been able to retain control over its colonies when Britain and France have had to relinquish their African holdings?



Implications for American Policy - 36

9

Africa's entrance into world politics is of vital concern to the United States. Now that the new African states are taking an active part in international affairs, the attitudes and actions of their leaders can be expected to have enormous impact on American policy. We have already seen the dynamic spirit of African nationalism at work in the United Nations, where African states exert an ever increasing influence. Today African states compose the largest single voting group in the world organization.

Clearly the peaceful development of Africa in harmony with the West is central to American interests. Yet the diversity of Africa, our inadequate knowledge and understanding of African aspirations and interests, and the general complexities and web of European-African relationships mean that there are no easy solutions to problems of American policy. Nor can the United States formulate a single African policy. Each situation must be examined against the perspective of general principles and goals.

Moreover American policymakers will have to operate in extremely fragile and delicate situations. As we have seen, governmental structures in most of Subsaharan Africa are weak and lack organizational strength. Boundaries are by no means permanent, and political alignments among leaders and states are uncertain. States which maintain friendly relations today might be hostile toward one another tomorrow. Or the leadership with which our government is currently negotiating might be replaced by men with opposite interests.

Today American government has become institutionalized. We know the methods which executive, judicial, or legislative branches of government will use to carry out policies. We also have well organized pressure groups through which we can exert influence upon governmental activities. Then, too, through political parties, newspapers,

access to courts, television, and a host of other established media, we can bring about orderly changes in governmental affairs.

But in many African states such processes have not become institutionalized. As we saw in Chapter 6, African leaders are constantly seeking new structures, processes, and organizations to solve their problems of nation-building, and for some time to come the institutions of government may remain fluid and not institutionalized. Many African states look to a handful of leaders whose actions cannot always be predicted and whose political power is not assured. Yet the Nkrumahs, Nyereres, and Kenyattas of Africa today wield influence comparable to that exercised by Jackson or Jefferson.

As a consequence Americans will often have to "play it by ear," keeping sensitive to the individual needs and demands of each situation. We must also be prepared to accept the fact that even the most astute experts will not always be able to predict the long range impact of particular decisions.

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE. The problem of determining American policy in Africa is greatly complicated by the threat of Communist penetration. During the past few years Communist activities have been considerably stepped up. Moreover, the Sino-Soviet split has rendered the situation even more complex.

In Africa, the Russians and the Chinese are competing for power and influence. Whereas the Russians generally support nationalist parties in power after independence, the Chinese have adopted a broader strategy of aiding both national govern-

ments and opposition groups depending upon which, in the Chinese view, has the greater revolutionary potential. The Chinese have emphasized that political independence is only one stage in the African revolution, and in their attempt to create an Afro-Asian bloc, they have stressed the racial affinity of Africans and Asians as against the Caucasian Russians, Europeans, and Americans.

Communist activities in Africa take many forms. Russia and China are not only expanding their loans to African states but are giving outright grants as well. Radio broadcasts beamed to Africa, scholarships to Africans to study in Moscow and Peking, and handouts to individual politicians are other favored techniques. Aid to the liberation movements in Southern Africa takes the form not only of cash but also of the training of African guerrilla fighters.

The drive of nationalism and the quest for a more rewarding life have not been caused by communism. Nor is the Sino-Soviet bloc responsible for all tensions within and among African nations. But Communists do exploit situations in which disorder and instability prevail. And Communists seek to expand their power and influence whenever opportunities exist.

In the struggle between the West and the Communist world, Africa is coming to occupy a position of great importance. Independent African states can help to build peaceful relations between states, and they have already demonstrated their potential roles as mediators in the United Nations. But African states can also be a source of grave international tension. This has already been dramatically illustrated by the events which have taken place in the Re-

public of the Congo since the summer of 1960.

AFRICAN PROBLEMS. But if we adopt a policy which views Africa primarily as a pawn in the Cold War, only helping and encouraging states that are friendly towards us, we may not achieve our major policy goal—the development of a community of friendly, progressive, and stable states sharing democratic values. African problems must be considered on their own merit, as African problems *per se*.

Among the many problem areas, at least four command particular attention: 1. African economic development; 2. relations within and among African states; 3. Africa's role in global politics; and 4. unsolved problems of colonialism and self-determination.

Relations between African states and the United States center primarily around economic aid. Such aid is important in two distinct but related ways: *within* African states, it is the basic tool for satisfying rising African expectations and building the viable economies upon which stable governments depend; and *between* African states and the United States, it provides a way of signifying our goodwill and cementing friendship.

In principle the United States favors granting economic aid to Africa. In practice, however, three major policy problems modify and define the extent of commitment: the scale of assistance, the political conditions under which aid is to be given, and the means by which it is allocated.

Despite a growing awareness of Africa's desperate need, the United States has a rather limited commitment. Some Americans argue that we should not encourage

massive government-to-government aid and technical assistance but should encourage private enterprise to take more initiative in Africa's economic development. They assert that free enterprise is part of the democratic way of life that the United States should encourage in the developing areas. Other Americans hold that only a massive program of government aid will suffice. Two facts substantiate this viewpoint: first, that in the African states most governments are committed to some degree of central economic planning; and second, that there is insufficient profit-incentive for much of the required private development. Private enterprise cannot provide capital and skills for the development of the 'infrastructure' (the schools, hospitals, roads, etc.) on which economic development depends. But it is generally agreed that generous offers of western private and public capital, technical assistance, and skills can greatly enhance cordial and close relations between Africa and the West.

People who agree about the scope of America's aid program do not always agree about the degree of control which the United States should retain over expenditures. Both the group which advocates a large scale program and that which wants a limited effort contain people who think that the United States should attach strings to its aid. They argue that we should not spend money abroad unless we can be assured that it will be used wisely. Certain "strings" are obviously attached to all aid programs: that funds are only given on the basis of submitted plans for expenditure, or that money lent will be repaid. But there are some Americans who argue that we should not spend money abroad unless

we can derive political or military gains from it. They argue that unless we exercise stringent controls, we cannot be certain that funds will not be used to strengthen governments which are unfriendly to us.

These arguments are countered by Americans who believe that aid programs will be effective only when they are administered in a spirit sympathetic to African needs. We cannot buy friendship, they say.

Moreover these observers maintain that wherever possible, Africans must be given opportunities to direct and control economic progress and independence. African leaders recognize their need for a helping hand, but they are not looking for a hand-out. And even though they now welcome economic links between Africa and the West, they fear becoming economically chained to any alien power. Thus if they felt that the West were using aid as a tool of economic imperialism, they might either refuse our aid or look elsewhere for assistance.

AVENUES FOR ASSISTANCE. Opinions vary regarding the specific channels through which aid should be administered. At present the United States distributes much of its technical assistance through the Agency for International Development (AID). Such programs in which the United States, by itself, gives aid to one African nation are bilateral programs—that is, they are agreements between two parties.

The United States has also begun to work through multilateral arrangements (agreements among more than two countries). The United Nations has, for example, set up a special program for African assistance, and by contributing to the United Nations, the United States supports



Mansbridge in PUNCH MAGAZINE.

this program. We also provide funds to international organizations (such as the World Bank and its affiliates, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Corporation) and to regional programs of technical assistance (such as the Economic Commission for Africa).

During the past few years, increasing attention has been paid to the possibilities of aid programs supported by West Europeans. In 1960, the United States and Canada joined with eighteen European nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Through the

OECD, members hope to coordinate not only economic policies among themselves, but also programs of aid to underdeveloped areas.

A major challenge to the United States is how best to develop and expand economic and political links between a free Africa and the Atlantic Community, without promoting divisive tendencies. European countries tend to channel their aid to Africa to their excolonies. Thus British aid goes primarily to English-speaking Africa and French aid primarily to French-speaking African states. Although the United States encourages European ties as long as they are freely entered into, such aid programs are not without their pitfalls. Many African states denounce ties between Europe and Africa on the grounds that these represent "neo-colonialist" interests. Those French-speaking states that are associate members of the European Common Market have particularly come under attack for this reason.

INTRA-AFRICAN RELATIONS. As we have seen, African states are going through the difficult process of sorting out their relationships among themselves. The task of maintaining internal stability is a primary concern of African states, many of which are threatened by secessionist movements. At the same time, African leaders seek to build cordial relationships with neighboring states. But irredentism, boundary disputes, language barriers, uneven distribution of resources, and other factors create tensions among states.

The United States has favored the principle of political unification in the hope that movements toward strong national governments will better contribute to an

overall pattern of stability and economic growth. The United States has also encouraged cooperative ventures among states and movements which may lead to regional integration.

SUPPORTERS OF REGIONALISM. Some Americans believe that the United States should automatically support all pan-Africanist and regional movements. These observers claim that many small nations in Africa are vulnerable to outside exploitation. They may find themselves swallowed by hostile powers.

Those who support confederationist movements point out that very small countries cannot support large-scale development programs. In a nonindustrial country of less than a million inhabitants, who would bear the cost for big industrial plants or modern universities? Such countries could, however, embark on joint ventures with their neighbors. Highways could link several nations, universities could be established for students of three or four countries, or health programs could be set up to combat a disease common to a geographical area encompassing several countries.

A DIFFERENT VIEW. The opposite point of view is held by a group which favors giving support to any movement toward self-determination. These people feel that regional, tribal, ethnic, or language interests should be recognized. If, for example, residents of Katanga Province, members of the Ashanti tribe, or the Somali peoples wish to establish individual states or forms of government, they should be encouraged to do so. This body of opinion maintains that, far from splintering Africa, encouraging such "logical" groupings would bring about more realistic forms of unity.

NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY. Some persons hold that policies which support all movements are too rigid and unrealistic. Simply supporting “self-determination”—the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live—does not give us a single obvious policy to pursue in Africa. Rather we have to pay attention to at least three important principles: 1. the right of self-determination; 2. the economic and administrative viability of the new states; and 3. the ability of liberation movements to command a national consensus. And it is vital to understand that these principles are not always compatible.

These considerations have led many Americans to argue that U.S. policy must remain flexible. But above all we must assure Africans of the right to work out their own destinies. When African organizations such as the Organization of African Unity can work out these problems (as the O.A.U. has done in the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco), the guiding rule of U.S. policy must be to support their efforts. Failure to do so might undermine the very basis of African unity which U.S. foreign policy encourages.

FOREIGN POLICY. In respect to global politics, Africa’s new leaders want to follow an independent course. They would like to maintain normal and friendly relations with all countries and to avoid as much as possible any involvement in the Cold War. This cautious approach to foreign policy in part reflects their economic and military weakness. Being acutely aware of the problems of maintaining and preserving national independence, African leaders are determined not to be swallowed up by new forms of imperialism.

“Just a simple agrarian reformer”



Long in *The Minneapolis Tribune*.

Because of their reluctance to take sides in the Cold War, emerging states are often labeled the “uncommitted” nations. In actuality African states are passionately committed to their own political and economic well being. African leaders regard neutralism as the only political posture which permits free development. As “independent voters” wooed by both sides, leaders enjoy a bargaining position between the western and eastern camps. Moreover, their policy of nonalignment gives African states an importance and influence in world politics not warranted by the usual measurements of power. We generally think of a powerful nation as having a strong military force; a large, highly skilled, well educated population; economic resources; and a high degree of productivity, among other advantages.

Lacking these traditional assets, African leaders have used other tactics. The idea of an "African personality" is itself an attempt to identify an independent African position on world issues. Within the United Nations, African states have acted as a distinctive group, meeting regularly to decide on common policies. They have pressed for U.N. control of the mandated territory of Southwest Africa, which is at present administered by South Africa; they have urged economic and other sanctions against South Africa to end her apartheid policies; and they have sought more consideration in the U.N. to African development problems. They have already achieved important results. African pressure has forced South Africa out of the International Labor Organization; the United States and the United Kingdom have placed selective arms embargoes on goods to South Africa; and the U.N. Commission on Trade and Development, which met in Geneva in the summer of 1964, agreed on measures that would help redress the unfavorable trade balance between the developing and the developed countries.

FRIENDLY TIES. Despite Africa's commitment to neutralism, the West at present enjoys an important advantage in the search for African friendship. Africa has had close historical, ideological, cultural, and economic ties with the West. France's policy of cultural assimilation, for example, has led to the creation of African societies which speak French, and which frequently are apt to identify themselves quite easily with France. One very important asset of western policy in Africa is the fact that French and English have become the basic languages throughout the continent.

Many of the governmental institutions evolving in Africa are based upon western systems. And most African leaders are committed to the values of democracy and regard it as a morally superior form of government.

Nevertheless, Africans judge American policy positions against the perspective of their own needs and aspirations. Failure to support African goals could jeopardize America's moral position and friendships with Africa's leaders.

THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. Probably the biggest challenge facing U.S. foreign policy is the problem of white minority rule in Southern Africa. In the past, the United States has been equivocal in its support of movements of national liberation in Southern Africa, primarily because of her fear of offending her European allies. Many Americans have also accepted the arguments put forth by the governments of Portugal and the Republic of South Africa that they are "pro-West" and the last bulwark against communism in Africa. It is pointed out that if the United States adopted a hostile attitude towards the Republic of South Africa, it might be cut off from South Africa's vital resources, particularly gold. It is further argued that economic sanctions against South Africa would hurt the Africans most since they are the poorest sector of the population. Americans who hold these viewpoints argue that while the United States should encourage all movements that seek to change apartheid policy peacefully, we should not support violent and intimidatory measures.

But a growing body of American opinion argues that the United States must take a

positive stand against apartheid. According to this view, the United States should exert all possible pressures upon the South African government to relinquish its controls as soon as possible. The United States, it is argued, should boycott South African goods and sever all diplomatic relations with the present Afrikaner government. Failure to take a positive stand against the "colonial" and racial policies in Southern Africa could cause us to lose the friendship of all Africa, and a negative policy could leave the field clear for Communist propaganda and influence.

Even if the United States cannot adopt such a policy of confrontation, we can take far more dynamic action than we have done in the past. Many Americans advocate, for example, that American governmental operations in Southern Africa should not deal with firms that practice racial discrimination. Moreover American missions should apply nondiscriminatory policies regarding their own staffs.

Through the United Nations and its affiliated international agencies, South Africa should be made to feel even stronger pressures of world opinion. Pressures should be exerted upon Europeans in Southern Africa to encourage widespread educational programs. Africans should be trained as quickly as possible for positions of political responsibility.

Using a variety of methods, such as direct and indirect pressure and education, the

United States could thus provide the moral leadership necessary to promote change in Southern Africa.

CONCLUSION. The United States stands at a crossroads in its relationship with the people of Africa. At stake are more than economic and strategic considerations: the challenges of Africa are whether liberty and freedom may flourish and whether indeed the dignity and fulfillment of man may be achieved. Throughout this booklet we have discussed the African response to the colonial impact. But a determining factor in Africa's step forward may well be the quality and capacity of the American response.

FOR FURTHER THOUGHT

1. Evaluate American actions in the Congo in the light of this statement, page 54: "But if we adopt a policy which views Africa primarily as a pawn in the Cold War . . . we may not achieve our major policy goal—the development of a community of friendly, progressive, and stable states sharing democratic values."
2. What kinds of economic needs, political values, and cultural attitudes tend to pull Africa closer to the West? To the Soviet Union? To China? Why might Africans be attracted to the theory of Afro-Asian racial affinity? Why might they reject this idea?

VOCABULARY AND CONCEPTS

Following are some words and phrases which are important for a better understanding of foreign policy problems relating to Africa. Some of these are explained in the booklet. Many are difficult to understand and require further research.

apartheid
boycott
colonialism
the Commonwealth
sovereignty
self-determination
national consensus
capital investment
tribalism
Afrikaner
oligarchy
Islam
animism
chieftaincy
kinship
market economy
fragile economy
cash cropping
western impact
regionalism
Pan-Africanism
federation
confederation
assimilation
neo-colonialism
one-party states

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